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I. INTRODUCTION

Under the traditional approach to legal malpractice, an attorney is liable
for negligence only to a client, with whom the attorney is in a privity
relationship.' Thus, an attorney's duties to non-clients are limited primarily
to the avoidance of intentional wrongs. 2 Recently, courts have expanded

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Rutgers School of LawCamden. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Professors Jay Feinman
and Karl Okamoto.
1. See, e.g., 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.1, at
360-61 (3d ed. 1989).
2. See 1 id. § 6.1, at 286-87 ("ITihe 'ex delicto' liability of the attorney to third persons
exists only for fraud, collusion, or a malicious or tortious act ... [including] fraud, malicious
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duties owed by attorneys to third-party non-clients; 3 however, considerable
confusion and disagreement exists regarding both the parameters and the
rationales for such extensions. 4 For example, courts invoking such diverse
legal doctrines as third-party beneficiary, negligent representation, gratuitous
undertaking, and the "balance of factors" test in negligence have reached
different results in cases involving fact patterns ranging from will and trust
drafting and trust administration to litigation, opinion letters, and business
transactions and disputes.'
In an effort to clarify or explain these cases, some commentators examine
the various doctrinal approaches, 6 while others focus on the different fact
patterns in which issues of third-party liability commonly arise.7 Whether the
viewpoint is doctrinal or contextual, determining the proper scope of a
lawyer's duty to non-clients is complicated by competing policy demands. On
one hand, there is a need to deter attorney misconduct and to protect and

compensate non-clients who have suffered as a result of an attorney's

negligence. 9 This latter need is especially compelling when the non-clients
have reasonably relied on the attorney to protect their interests.' 0 On the

prosecution, abuse of process, false arrest or imprisonment, interference with an advantageous
relationship, intentional infliction of mental distress, invasion of privacy, [and] defamation

3. See 1 id. § 7.9, at 375-76.
4. See id. See generally JAY M.

FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF
PROFESSIONALS AND BusINEsSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC Loss (forthcoming)

(manuscript at ch. 9); Douglas A. Cifu, ExpandingLegalMalpracticeto Nonclient Third Parties
- At What Cost?, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1989); Donald B. Hilliker, Attorney
Liability to Third Parties:A Look to the Future, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 41 (1986); Walter Probert
& Robert A. Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice:Duty RelationshipsBeyond Contract, 55 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 708 (1980).
5. See generally FEINMAN, supra note 4, §§ 9.3-.4 (organizing analysis of cases both by
doctrine and by fact patterns).
6. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 4, § 9.3; Cifu, supra note 4, at 2-3; Hilliker, supra note
4, at 55-67; Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party

Liabilityof Accountants and Attorneysfor NegligentMisrepresentation,52 OHIO

ST.

L.J. 1309,

1311 (1991).
7. See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 4, § 9.4; Forest J. Bowman, Lawyer Liability to NonClients, 97 DIcK. L. REv. 267, 269-79 (1993); Helen Bishop Jenkins, Privity - A Texas-Size
Barrierto ThirdPartiesfor Negligent Will Drafting- An Assessment andProposal,42 BAYLOR
L. REV. 657 (1990); Robert F. Phelps, Jr., RepresentingTrusts and Trustees- Who is the Client
and Do Notions of Privity Protect the Client Relationship?,66 CONN. B.J. 211 (1992); Darrel
A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opinions in Securities Transactions,16 J. CORP. L. 375,
391-402 (1991).
8. E.g., Cifu, supra note 4, at 2.

9. See id.
10. In one of the earliest cases eroding the privity requirement for negligent misrepresentation,
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), the court held that a public weigher could be
held liable to a buyer of beans who had relied on a negligently issued certificate of weight,
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other hand, there is a need to protect lawyers from indeterminate liability."
Further, any widespread extension of attorney liability will cause the public
to bear a large share of the burden in the form of higher legal fees."
Taken alone, these competing policy considerations are no different than
those which exist in other areas of third-party liability, including that of
accountants, architects, and engineers. 3 An additional concern that applies
with special force in the legal profession, however, is the extent to which
recognizing a lawyer's duty to third persons may diminish the quality of the
lawyer's service to a client, particularly when the client and the third persons
have actual or potential conflicting interests.' 4
Consider, for example, the development of third-party liability in
California, the jurisdiction that led the way in extending a lawyer's duty to
non-clients. The early cases involved a lawyer's liability to the beneficiaries
of a negligently drafted will." The traditional privity requirement was
eliminated in favor of what appeared to be an extremely broad "balance of
factors" test:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and invokes the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the

because the seller had requested the weigher to furnish the plaintiff with a copy of the certificate
knowing that the plaintiff would rely on its accuracy. Similarly, in the well-known decision of
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988),
negligent misrepresentation was the doctrinal basis for recovery against the debtor's lawyer by
a lender who had relied on a formal opinion from the lawyer that the collateral for the loan was
free of liens.
11. This fear was cited as early as 1879 in Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198-200
(1879), the leading case on third-party economic loss. See generally FEINMAN, supra note 4.
12. Cf. Hilliker, supra note 4, at 54 (discussing cases justifying extensions of accountants'
liability on grounds that the "profession is capable of passing the risk to its customers and the
public").
13. See, e.g., id. (discussing third-party liability of accountants). See generally FEINMAN,
supra note 4.
14. See, e.g., Cifu, supra note 4, at 15-24.
15. In the leading case, Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (en bane), although the
defendant was a notary public who prepared a will but negligently failed to have it properly
attested, the court treated the case as one involving professional malpractice. Shortly thereafter,
in Lucas v. Haem, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (Cal. 1961) (en bane), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962), the court applied the Biakanja holding to a case involving an attorney who had
negligently drafted a will.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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policy of preventing future harm.1

That the test was intended to be applied broadly is evidenced by subsequent
California cases outside the legal malpractice area. Thus, the balance of
factors test was applied both to eliminate restrictive rules of liability of
possessors of land for injuries to persons entering upon the land 7 'and to
extend liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress" and negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage.' 9 Indeed, at one point the
California Supreme Court boldly declared that in negligence cases generally,

it had shifted away from "traditional notions of duty" in favor of "foreseeability as the key component necessary to establish liability. 2
In the legal malpractice area, however, the court hastily retreated from the
broad "foreseeability" test to a much narrower test in which virtually the only
factor considered is the extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit
the third-party non-client.2" The stated reason for this retreat was the court's
concern that extending an attorney's liability to third parties "with whom the
client deals at arm's length would inject undesirable self-protective reservations
into the attorney's counselling role, . . . [resulting in both] 'an undue burden
on the profession' and a diminution in the quality of legal services received by
the client. "I The early will-drafting cases did not address these concerns
16. Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19.
17. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (holding ordinary principles
of negligence apply to social guests as well as to business invitees), supersededby statute on
othergrounds, CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1714.7 (West 1985).

18. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en bane) (allowing recovery for mother who
suffered emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing child negligently killed by
defendant).
19. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (holding lessee could recover economic
damages resulting from negligent delay in completion of construction project at premises where
lessee operated its restaurant). In J'Aire the court explicitly stated that it had "repeatedly
eschewed overly rigid common law formulations of duty infavor of allowing compensation for
foreseeable injuries caused by a defendant's want of ordinary care." Id. at 64.
20. Id.; see also Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582, 534 (Sup.
Ct. 1977) (referring to the "obsolescence of the strict privity doctrine" in holding attorney liable
to third-party lender for failing to file and perfect security agreements).
21. See, e.g., Cifu, supra note 4, at 11 ("[Slubsequent interpretations of the [balance of
factors] test by the California Supreme Court have cast doubt upon whether this is anything but
a disguised rule of liability based upon third party beneficiary theory" (footnote omitted)). For
example, in Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976), the court refused to extend liability
to an attorney who negligently gave his clients incorrect information about stock sold to plaintiffs
by the clients. Subsequent cases have interpreted Goodman as limiting an attorney's liability to
non-clients to "situations wherein the third party is the intended beneficiary of the attorney's
services, or the foreseeability of harm to the third party as a consequence of professional
negligence is not outweighed by other policy considerations." St. Paul Title Co. v. Meier, 226
Cal. Rptr. 538, 539 (Ct. App. 1986). See generally FEINMAN, supra note 4, at § 9.3.
22. Goodman, 556 P.2d at 743 (footnote omitted) (quoting Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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because they did not involve any conflict of interest between the client-testators
and the non-client beneficiaries.' Given this lack of conflict, it should not
be surprising that the will-drafting cases are accepted in almost every
jurisdiction as the one exception to the traditional privity rule, irrespective of
the particular doctrinal approach taken.24 Outside the narrow spectrum of
will drafting cases, however, most cases do present the possibility of
conflicting interests in varying degrees, thereby resulting in an understandable
reluctance on the part of courts to extend the scope of a lawyer's duty to nonclients. 5
Despite the concern with potential conflicts of interest, a growing number
of cases have expanded the lawyer's duty to third-party non-clients who rely
on the lawyer, in factual situations that go beyond the early will-drafting
cases. 6 Many of these cases involve a lawyer dealing with multiple persons
or entities where there is some ambiguity regarding the proper identification
of the client or clients.27 This ambiguity, which is often unstated, has been
explicitly addressed in a series of related and sometimes overlapping cases
where the plaintiff claimed an attorney-client relationship existed with the
defendant-lawyer. 28 This claim frequently arises in cases involving a lawyer
who represents an entity such as a closely held corporation or partnership and
deals directly with individual constituents of the entity such as the officers,
directors, shareholders, or partners. 29
A particularly interesting aspect of these attorney-client relationship cases,

688 (Cal. 1961) (en bane), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962)).
23. Drafting a will may involve a potential for conflict regarding both the initial determination
of whether and under what terms to make bequests and in any subsequent determinations of
whether to change the will to the detriment of the initial beneficiaries. Once those decisions have
been made, however, the testator and the beneficiaries have identical interests in having the
attorney exercise reasonable care to translate the testator's intent into a valid will.
24. E.g., 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, supranote 1, § 7.10, at 379. Where a potential conflict exists
between the testator and the beneficiaries, courts are less likely to permit any departure from the
strict privity requirements. See, e.g., Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733 (Conn. 1988) (holding
attorney not liable to third-party beneficiaries for negligent delay in execution of client's estate
planning documents).
25. Thus, the more recent California cases involving legal malpractice rejected attempts by
third parties to eliminate the privity requirement in factual situations ranging from opinions issued
in connection with a sale of stock, Goodman, 556 P.2d 737, instructions to an escrow agent, St.
Paul Title Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 538, and mortgage foreclosure proceedings, Sooy v. Peter, 270
Cal. Rptr. 151 (Ct. App. 1990) - all cases in which the courts declined to engage in any
extensive analysis of the various policy considerations and instead favored the more traditional
holding that the lawyer's professional duty of care does not extend to parties engaged in either
adversarial proceedings or arm's length transactions.
26. See, e.g., 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 1, §§ 7.10-.11.
27. See infra parts II, VII.
28. See infra parts II, VII.
29. See infra parts I-V.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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when viewed in conjunction with the third-party liability cases, is the extent
to which the resolution of the attorney-client relationship question is similarly
complicated by a concern for actual or potential conflicts of interest.
Consequently, despite the difficulties in treating closely held corporations and
small partnerships as entities distinct from their individual constituents,30
courts have resisted claims of individual representation (at least in the absence
of an express agreement) because they realize that the interests of entities and
their constituents are often diametrically opposed."
When the question is one of extending an attorney's liability to third-party
non-clients, the concern that conflicting interests will chill an attorney's loyalty
to a client is undoubtedly a cause for serious concern. When the question is
one of recognizing the simultaneous representation of more than one client,
however, the existence of conflicting interests is not always an unalloyed evil.
Under the attorney ethics codes of all jurisdictions, the representation of
conflicting interests is not necessarily unethical: Unless the lawyer fails to
obtain the clients' informed consent, or the conflict is so severe that a
reasonable lawyer would not agree to represent the clients in those particular
circumstances, 32 then lawyers may and commonly do represent more than one
client in a single transaction or proceeding.33 Multiple representation is
permitted because it is sometimes in the best interests of the clients to risk the
inherent dangers of multiple representation to achieve a significant benefit in
the form of either cheaper and more efficient representation or an enhanced
ability to resolve minor differences and reach a shared goal.
Further complicating the cases which directly address the existence of an
attorney-client relationship is the prevalent view that the relationship is
"fundamentally a contractual relationship," in which the law looks primarily
to the actual intentions of the parties, whether express or implied.3 5 Unfortu-

30. See, e.g., Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d
645, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
31. See, e.g., Goerlich v. Courtney Indus., Inc., 581 A.2d 825, 828 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990), cert. denied, 586 A.2d 13 (Md. 1991).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1983).

33. See generallyCHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 349-58 (1986) (discussing
conflicts in simultaneous representations); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the
SimultaneousRepresentationof Multiple Clients:A ProposedSolution to the Current Confusion
and Controversy, 61 TEx. L. REv. 211 (1982) (discussing conflicts in simultaneous representations); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 201-02 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991) (discussing conflicts of interests).
34. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 33, at 213-14.
35. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13:106, at 75 (2d ed. Supp.

1993); see also Ronald I. Friedman, The Creation of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An
Emerging View, 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 209, 213 (1986) ("mhe starting point of analysis in the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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nately, all too often the parties have not thought about the matter in precisely
those terms, and yet the "clients" may have relied on the attorneys to protect
their interests in the transaction or proceeding. This reliance is particularly
notable in cases involving entity-constituent relations, in which lay individuals
36
typically do not view the entity in the same abstract manner as do lawyers.
Thus, in the entity context, individual constituents frequently rely on the entity
lawyer to protect their interests. Although the reliance may be both reasonable
and foreseeable, these individuals may be precluded from recovery when the
lawyer is negligent because: (1) concern about conflicts and a rigid adherence
to formal notions of privity prevent courts from finding an attorney-client
relationship;37 and (2) concern about conflicts prevents the courts from
extending liability to the constituent as a third-party non-client.38
Entity representation is a good example of a situation where there is
inherent, or at least frequent, ambiguity regarding the identification of the
client both by the parties themselves, at the time of the relevant events, and
by the courts, which must reconstruct the significance of these same events at
a later time. The purpose of this article is to explore the possibility that the
difficulties posed by entity representation and similar situations are better dealt
with by reconceptualizing the attorney-client relationship, rather than by
extending the attorney's duty to third-party non-clients.
Part II of this article surveys several recent decisions in the entity
representation area that reveal the courts' current confusion regarding both the
potential liability of the lawyer to individual constituents and the appropriate
role of the lawyer in dealing with such individuals. It concludes that while
courts increasingly recognize the difficulties in treating these businesses as
entities distinct from the shareholders or partners, the present inclination to
resolve these difficulties by extending third-party liability is problematic. A
better approach might be to recognize that the entity lawyer may have entered
into an attorney-client relationship with an individual constituent even though
the lawyer did not intend to do so.
Part III discusses one of several obstacles that prevents courts from
exploring this alternative solution: the reliance that courts often place on the
provision in attorney ethics codes that an entity lawyer represents the entity
and not its constituents. Part III examines both the radical view that the entity
theory of representation has no meaning in the context of small organizations
like closely held corporations and the more moderate view that while the entity
itself cannot be ignored, the ethics rules should not be read to exclude the
possibility that an entity lawyer might also represent one or more individual

creation of an attorney-client relationship is the law of contract.").
36. See infra text accompanying notes 76-91.
37. See infra parts II-IV.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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constituents. The more prevalent view is that there is at least a presumption
that entity lawyers represent only the entity itself and not the individuals, but
that specific circumstances may show otherwise. Unfortunately, it is not clear
what circumstances suffice to demonstrate individual representation in
particular cases.
Part IV discusses another major obstacle to the recognition of an attorneyclient relationship in the context of entity representation: the continued
adherence to a contract-based standard for determining when the relationship
is formed. Part IV concludes that this approach has little justification and that
a tort-based approach is preferable to a contract-based approach, at least in the
many jurisdictions in which a malpractice action can be brought in tort. Part
IV then examines an appropriate tort-based approach to the formation of an
attorney-client relationship. Borrowing from a line of cases involving attorney
disqualification, the section concludes that an appropriate standard would
include situations in which a foreseeable risk exists that individuals will act
under the reasonable expectation that a lawyer is representing them. Under
the proposed standard, lawyers who fail to clarify their role in inherently
ambiguous situations will be considered to have entered into an attorney-client
relationship with all persons who reasonably rely on the lawyer to protect their
interests.
Part V refines the reasonable expectations test and demonstrates how it
might be applied to legal malpractice cases involving entity representation.
Part VI considers the advantages and disadvantages of reconceptualizing
the attorney-client relationship in this manner. The alternative would be a
more fumctionalist approach in which courts take into account the purpose to
be served and in which additional categories like "quasi-client" or "derivative
client" are recognized. Part VI concludes that while a more functional
approach makes sense in some cases, there are significant advantages to the
reconceptualization approach in cases in which the rationale for imposing
liability involves confusion regarding the lawyer's role.
Finally, Part VII suggests how reconceptualizing the attorney-client
relationship might be useful in clarifying some recent cases in other representation areas, including representation of family members, transactions between
buyers and sellers or borrowers and lenders, and representation of fiduciaries,
including trustees and guardians.
II. VIEWING THE PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF ENTITY REPRESENTATION
A quick survey of several recent decisions in the entity representation area
reveals considerable confusion regarding not only the potential liability of an
entity lawyer to individual constituents, but also the proper role of the lawyer
in dealing with such individuals. Some of the decisions reflect the traditional
restrictive approach where courts refuse to find either an attorney-client
relationship or any third-party liability, regardless of the extent to which the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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individuals may have reasonably relied on the attorney to protect their
interests.39 Other decisions indicate increasing discomfort with the inflexibility of the traditional approach and a willingness to examine the facts of each
case. 40 However, even these courts have been unable to articulate a consistent rationale for particular extensions of liability, in large part due to their
rigid adherence both to a contractual, privity-based concept of the attorneyclient relationship 4 and to a narrow view of the proper role of an entity
lawyer in dealing with individual constituents.42
The traditional restrictive approach to entity representation is illustrated
by Torres v. Divis,43 a recent decision by the Illinois Appellate Court.
Torres was one of several investors and incorporators of a business formed to
purchase and manage a restaurant. After Torres and his co-investors took over
the restaurant, they became aware of numerous debts that had been previously
incurred by the business. Unable to rescind the purchase agreement, Torres
brought a malpractice action against the defendant lawyer who had incorporated and represented the corporation. While Torres did not deal directly with
the lawyer, Torres stated he believed the lawyer was representing him, just as
the lawyer represented one of Torres's co-investors, Powers. Without even
exploring the reasonableness of this belief," the court held that no attorneyclient relationship existed between Torres and the lawyer because that
"relationship is consensual and arises only when both the attorney and client
have consented to its formation," and no evidence suggested that the lawyer
had expressly agreed to represent Torres.45
The court also held that Torres could not recover under a third-party
liability theory because the facts did not demonstrate that the primary purpose
of the attorney-client relationship (between either the lawyer and Powers or the
lawyer and the corporation) was to benefit Torres. 46 The court emphasized
that its reluctance to find that the defendant lawyer owed any duty to Torres
stemmed from its concern for potential conflicts between the individual
investors:

39. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 60-72.
41. See infra text accompanying note 51.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 52-57.
43. 494 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
44. In his brief, Torres alleged that Powers testified that the lawyer had agreed to represent
the incorporators; however, no such testimony appeared in the record. Id. at 1231 n.2. The court
did find that Torres presented evidence indicating that the lawyer had agreed to represent Powers
and to incorporate and represent the corporation formed to purchase the restaurant. Id. at 1231.
The defendant lawyer apparently did not deny that he was aware that Torres was one of the
incorporators.
45. Id. For a discussion of the problems of this contract-based approach, see infra part V.
46. Torres, 494 N.E.2d at 1231.
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The interests of the incorporators of a closely-held business are not always
the same, and they are often adverse. Each incorporator may seek to
maximize his personal return and to minimize his personal contributions.
S. . It would be unwise to impose on an attorney, retained by only one

of several incorporators for the purpose of organizing a corporation, a duty
to act on behalf of all of the incorporators in the absence of an agreement
that he do so. Recognition of such a duty would create an unacceptably
wide range of potential conflicts of interest.47

The court, however, failed to address both the obvious potential for
conflict between the two clients the lawyer did expressly agree to represent the corporation and Powers48 - and the fact that lawyers frequently do
represent groups of individuals forming an entity such as a partnership or
corporation. 4 9 If the defendant lawyer could reasonably have foreseen that
Torres and the other investors would rely on him as their attorney, then surely.
that fact ought to have had some bearing on the determination of whether the
lawyer owed them any duty.50
47. Id.; see also Buford White Lumber Co. Profit Sharing & Say. Plan &Trust v. Octagon
Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1561 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (holding that attorney for general
partner owes no duty to limited partners in a securities exchange transaction; to find otherwise
would require an inference that the lawyer represented both the seller and the purchasers in "a
potential direct conflict-of-interestsituation"); Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282
Cal. Rptr. 627, 636-37 (Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to extend liability of the attorney for a closely
held corporation to a minority shareholder because of the potential for conflicting interests
between the shareholder and the corporation); Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (refusing to extend duty of corporate attorney to minority shareholder because "[e]ven
in closely held corporations, minority shareholders often have conflicting interests with the
corporation").
48. For example, if Powers sought to "maximize his personal return and to minimize his
personal contribution," Torres, 494 N.E.2d at 1231, that may have adversely affected both the
solvency of the newly formed corporate entity and the financial interests of the co-investors.
49. See, e.g., In re Ireland, 706 P.2d 352 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam); Schaeffer v.
Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 541 N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989); Lewis
v. Alper, 224 N.Y.S.2d 996 (App. Div. 1962) (mem.).
50. At the very least, it would be appropriate to acknowledge that the lawyer had a duty to
exercise care in incorporating the business and should have been liable if damages had occurred
as a result of any negligent incorporation. Cf. Adell v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz,
P.C., 428 N.W.2d 26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding limited partner may sue lawyer hired by
general partner for negligence in formation of partnership, including failure to secure tax advice);
Gunn v. Mahoney, 408 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding plaintiff stated a cause of action
when he alleged lawyer failed to incorporate his business); Lewis, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 996 (holding
incorporators who sued lawyer for negligence in delayed filing of certificate of incorporation
failed to prove the issue of causation). Indeed, prior to incorporation, the fictional corporate
entity does not yet exist. E.g., Speedee Oil Change No. 2, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
444 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (extending third-party liability to grant plaintiff corporation
a cause of action against lawyer who gave negligent advice to promoters regarding option to
extend a lease). But cf. Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992) (holding that when
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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In Tones the court invoked the contractual nature of the attorney-client
relationship as a barrier to finding that the attorney who drafted incorporation
papers represented the incorporators individually.5 Other courts have raised
as a barrier a narrow, unrealistic view of the proper role of a lawyer retained
by a corporation or other similar entity. For example, in Egan v. McNamar 5 2 the estate of Rohrich, the majority shareholder of a small, closely
held corporation, sought to rescind a buy-sell agreement between the
shareholders and the corporation, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty on the
part of the lawyer for the corporation who was himself a director and a
shareholder, as well as a party to the agreement. The estate claimed that the
defendant lawyer also represented Rohrich, and indeed the lawyer had
previously represented Rohrich both prior to the lawyer's association with the
corporation and subsequently, during a "period of extensive estate and
corporate planning" 53 in which Rohrich and the lawyer initiated a series of
transactions which ultimately led to the buy-sell agreement. This series of
transactions was initiated to achieve various personal goals established by
54
Rohrich.
Despite this extensive history of prior dealings, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals summarily rejected the possibility of any attorney-client
relationship between the defendant lawyer and Rohrich. Citing Ethical
Consideration 5-18 of the District of Columbia Code of Professional
Responsibility, the court held that because a lawyer employed by a corporation
"represents the entity, not its individual shareholders, officers and directors,"
the lawyer's sole duty in the transaction was to protect the corporation's
"primary concerns. " ' The court, however, failed to address the possibility
that Rohrich might have continued to view the defendant as his lawyer,56

a lawyer is retained by a person to form a corporation, the corporation becomes the client
retroactively).
51. See Torres, 494 N.E.2d at 1231; see also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177
(N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (holding vice-presidentwho indemnified a corporate loan could not sue the
corporation's attorney for negligent certification of title).
52. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
53. Id. at 736.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 738. For a discussionof EC 5-18 of the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility,

on which the D.C. Code provision was based, see infra text accompanying note 75. For another
decision citing EC 5-18 as a ground for rejecting an attorney-client relationship between an entity
lawyer and its constituent, see, e.g. Quintel Corp., N.V.v. Citibank, N.A., 589 F. Supp. 1235,
1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing EC-5-18 of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility in
holding that the duty of a lawyer who represented a limited partnership runs to the partnership,
not to the limited partners).
56. The lawyer testified that "he expressly told Rohrich not to rely on him as counsel since
he was party to the agreement." Egan, 467 A.2d at 737. The court, however, did not even
mention this testimony in the portion of its opinion discussing the estate's claim of an attorneyPublished by Scholar Commons, 1994
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especially in light of the fact that the corporation itself had no real interest in
the particular transaction. 7
In Egan Rohrich's estate also alleged that, apart from any attorney-client
relationship, the lawyer owed Rohrich a fiduciary duty based on the trust
relationship between shareholders and participants in a close corporation. The
court also rejected this claim.58 However, in Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz,
Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., the Michigan Court of Appeals accepted
a similar claim in a lawsuit brought by a fifty percent shareholder against the
corporation's lawyer. In Fassihithe defendant lawyer drafted the agreements

pertaining to membership in a professional corporation in which physicians
Fassihi and Lopez were equal shareholders. Eighteen months later, the lawyer
assisted Lopez in ousting Fassihi from the corporation while Lopez simultaneously exercised the authority he had under prior agreements with the
hospital to oust Fassihi from the staff of the radiology department.' In his
subsequent lawsuit against the lawyer, Fassihi alleged that the lawyer breached
his fiduciary duty to Fassihi by failing to inform him either that the lawyer
was representing Lopez individually or that he was aware of Lopez's prior
agreements with the hospital. 6
Like Rohrich's estate in Egan, Fassihi alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
based on both an attorney-client relationship and a separate trust relationship.

client relationship. See id. at 738-39. In any event, the lawyer had reviewed the agreement, and
though the court found that he did so on behalf of the corporation, id. at 739, Rohrich may well
have viewed himself and the corporation as indistinguishable. For a further discussion of the
significance of such a statement in determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship
under the standard proposed in this article, see infra text accompanying note 174.
57. The court attempted to articulate an interest of the corporation that was separate from the
interests of the shareholders, but its discussion merely underscores the extent to which the only
interests in a buy-sell agreement are those of "existing shareholders [who] do not want outside
parties to obtain control of the corporation through the purchase of shares upon the death or
withdrawal of a present shareholder." Egan, 467 A.2d at 739. For a discussion of the view that
the entity theory of representation may have no meaning in the case of small organizations such
as a closely held corporations or partnerships, see infra text accompanying note 78.
58. The court stated the following:
Assertions that in a close corporation . . . the individuals involved are the
corporation, do not disturb the conclusion that there was no fiduciary duty. [The
lawyer] represented the corporation, an entity legally distinct from its directors,
officers, and shareholders. As [the corporation's] counsel, his obligation was to
ensure that the agreement was in the best interest of the company, regardless of its
impact on individual shareholders.
Egan, 467 A.2d at 739 (emphasis in original); accord Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555 (Ii.
App. Ct. 1988); Schaeffer v. Cohen, Rosenthal, Price, Mirkin, Jennings & Berg, P.C., 541
N.E.2d 997 (Mass. 1989).
59. 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
60. Id. at 647.
61. Id.
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Not surprisingly, the court in Fassihi quickly disposed of the claim that an
attorney-client relationship existed between the lawyer and Fassihi, citing the
same narrow view of the role of a corporate attorney taken in Egan:
A corporation exists as an entity apart from its shareholders, even
where the corporation has but one shareholder. While no Michigan case
has addressed whether a corporation's attorney has an attorney-client
relationship with the entity's shareholders, the general proposition of
corporate identity apart from its shareholders leads us to conclude, in
accordance with decisions from other jurisdictions,
that the attorney's
62
client is the corporation and not the shareholders.
Although the court rejected any possibility that the lawyer had assumed
an attorney-client relationship with Fassihi when he agreed to help form the
professional corporation, the Fassihicourt nonetheless was disturbed that the
lawyer had sided with Lopez against Fassihi from the very outset. The court
sympathetically noted Fassihi's claim that "he reposed in [the defendant
lawyer] his trust and confidence and believed that, as a 50% shareholder..
., defendant would treat him with the same degree of loyalty and impartiality
extended to the other shareholder, Dr. Lopez."6 Moreover, although the
court distinguished corporate veil piercing cases, it agreed that those cases
were instructive in pointing out "the difficulties in treating a closely held
corporation with few shareholders as an entity distinct from the sharehold"
ers. 6
These "difficulties" did not persuade the court to re-examine its summary
rejection of an attorney-client relationship between the defendant and Fassihi.
The court, however, indicated that the lawyer may have owed Fassihi a
fiduciary duty based on the concept of a "confidential relationship" arising
from the trust and confidence Fassihi alleged he placed in the lawyer.' But,
the court did not explain the significance, in this context, of distinguishing
between a fiduciary duty based on a relationship of trust and an ordinary
attorney-client relationship.
In Fassihi the defendant lawyer allegedly
62. Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Fassihi, 309 N.W.2d at 649.

65. Id. at 648. As stated by the court:
A fiduciary relationship arises when one reposes faith, confidence, and trust in
another's judgment and advice. Where a confidence has been betrayed by the party
in the position of influence, this betrayal is actionable, and the origin of the
confidence is immaterial. Furthermore, whether there exists a confidential
relationship apart from a well-defined fiduciary category is a question of fact. Based
upon the pleadings, we cannot say that plaintiff's claim is clearly unenforceable as a
matter of law.
Id. (citations omitted).
66. For a discussion of the significance of a fiduciary duty separate from an attorney-client
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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breached a duty of loyalty, but it could just as easily have been a question of
incompetence. If, for example, the lawyer had negligently failed to create a
valid corporation, it would be hard to understand how the court could hold
that Lopez, but not Fassihi, could recover damages; and if Fassihi could have
recovered damages based on negligent incorporation, then the court clearly
would have created the functional equivalent of a full-scale attorney-client

relationship.
A similar result was reached in Kelly v. Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman &
Maycock,67 a case decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals under Utah
law. Plaintiff Kelly was an officer and director of Earth Energy Resources
(EER), which hired the defendant law firm to represent it in several securities
transactions. EER sold some limited partnerships in violation of state
securities laws and the purchasers of the partnerships sued Kelly and others
individually. Kelly in turn sued the law firm for failure to inform her of her
potential liability."
As in Egan and Fassihi, Kelly alleged that an attorney-client relationship
existed between herself and the law firm. Indeed, even under the traditional
tests, fairly strong support for such a relationship existed because the retention
agreement specifically stated that the law firm "agreed to provide '[a]dvice
with respect to liabilities . . .[of] officers, directors and others in connection
with... the offering.'"69 Nonetheless, the Kelly court summarily rejected
this claim, invoking the standard litany that "'the fact that an attorney
represents a corporation does not make that attorney counsel to officers and
directors of the corporation.'"7 The court, however, did acknowledge that
the agreement created an intended third-party beneficiary relationship and that
the law firm had breached its duty of care to Kelly. 7' Given the specific
language of the retention agreement, this result is not surprising; however, it
is surprising that the court failed even to consider whether the agreement
created an attorney-client relationship based on the law firm's express promise
to render legal advice to Kelly and the other officers and directors of the
corporation.

relationship in the context of a motion to disqualify an attorney in pending litigation, see infra
text accompanying notes 137-50.
67. No. 89-4033 and 89-4039, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19742 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
opinion).
68. Id. at *1-*2. After the purchasers obtained a judgment against Kelly, she threatened to
file bankruptcy. The purchasers then agreed to drop their claims against her in return for her
agreement to pursue a legal malpractice claim against the law firm and assign most of any
recovery to the purchasers. Id. at *2.
69. Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting appellant's brief at 6).
70. Id. at *6 (quoting Kline Hotel Partners v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 708 F. Supp.
1193, 1195 (D. Colo. 1989) (mem.)).
71. Id. at *7.
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As decisions like Fassihiand Kelly demonstrate, courts are beginning to
recognize that in some entity cases the nature of the relationship between an
entity's lawyer and its individual constituents may be such that the lawyer
owes a duty to the constituents. But what type of duty is owed, and how will
it be established from case to case? To call it a "fiduciary duty" as the Fassihi
court did ignores situations where an individual's interest in competent
representation may be just as compelling as her interest in loyalty. Calling it
"third-party liability," as the Kelly court did, solves the competency problem;
however, under this approach it would not be clear whether or when a duty
of loyalty or confidentiality will be imposed, because third-party liability
traditionally has not included an attorney's fiduciary duties. 72
Perhaps the better approach is to recognize that given the frequent
ambiguity of the relationship between an entity's lawyer and its individual
constituents, entity lawyers who fail to clarify their role may be held to have
entered into an attorney-client relationship with individual constituents, even
though they had no intention of doing so. Before the merits of this approach
can be fairly examined, it is first necessary to explore some of the obstacles
that have prevented courts from exploring this alternative solution. These
obstacles include the misuse of ethics code provisions relating to entity
representation and the continued adherence to an outdated contract-based
model for the formation of an attorney-client relationship.
III. THE MISUSE OF ETHICS CODE PROVISIONS
IN ENTITY REPRESENTATION CASES

As in Egan v. McNamara,73 courts that refuse to find an attorney-client
relationship between an entity lawyer and an individual constituent often rely
on attorney codes of conduct.7 4 These ethics codes typically provide that "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity."' Reliance on
such provisions raises several problems, including both the questionable
viability of the concept of entity representation for lawyers dealing with
closely held corporations and partnerships and the strong possibility in
particular cases that the lawyer is representing both the entity itself and one

72. See 1 MALLEN & SMrIH, supra note 1, § 7.3.
73. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
74. See supra text accompanying note 55.
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983). The Model Code of

ProfessionalResponsibilitywas superseded in 1983 by the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,
which provide that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization through its duly authorized constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (1992).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:659

or more of its individual constituents.
The concept of entity representation has been generally accepted for large,
publicly held corporations.76 However, there is increasing dissatisfaction
with its usefulness in the context of smaller organizations,77 particularly in
regard to such intra-organizational matters as choice of an organizational form,
questions of capital structure, finance or control mechanisms, and disputes
among constituents. According to one view, a small organization like a
closely held corporation may well be a separate legal entity for purposes of its
dealing with outsiders; however, with respect to intra-organizational relations,
the fictional "entity" has no interests to represent and the only relevant
interests are those of the individuals themselves."

76. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Towarda Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 466, 469 & n.13 (1989) (stating that the Model
Rules ofProfessionalConductwere drafted with the traditional corporate model in mind (footnote
omitted)).
77. See id. at 468-69.
78. Id. at 466-81. At one point, Professor Mitchell makes this point by analogizing
shareholders of a close corporation to partners, at least in their dealings with one another. Id. at
469. He suggests that partnerships, unlike corporations, are treated as an aggregate of individuals
under the Model Rules. Id. at 470 & n.15. However, a recent ABA opinion states that "[a]
partnership is an organization within the meaning of Rule 1.13" and that "[g]enerally, a lawyer
who represents a partnership represents the entity rather than the individual partners." ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, at 1 (1991); see also
Michael R.H. Post, Representing a Tax Matters Partner:Who is the Client?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 527, 532-34 (1993) (stating that, under the Model Rules, the lawyer for a partnership
owes primary allegiance to the entity).
The support cited by Professor Mitchell - a statement suggesting that the entity theory
under Rule 1.13 applies only when the entity is treated as such under other law - initially
appeared in the Legal Backgroundsection to an early version of Rule 1.13. See Mitchell, supra
note 76, at 470 n. 15 (citing ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, LEGAL
BACKGROUND 147 (1984)). At that time, the comment to Rule 1.13(a) stated merely that "[t]he
duty defined in this Rule applies to unincorporated associations." ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION
OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUT 85 (Proposed Final
Draft, May 30, 1981). As officially adopted in 1983, this statement was revised to read: "The
duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. (1992) (emphasis added). In addition, the application
of the entity theory in Rule 1.13(a) to unincorporated associations was given further prominence
by the addition of the sentence in the comment: "'Other constituents' as used in this Comment
means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons
acting for organizational clients that are not corporations." Id.
Most courts treat partnerships, particularly limited partnerships, like corporations for
purposes of the entity representation rule. See, e.g., Quintel Corp., N.V.v. Citibank, N.A., 589
F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Marguliesv. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). However,
a few California cases hold that an attorney for a partnership represents all partners in matters
regarding partnership business. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Ct. App.
1987); Wortham & Van Liew v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Ct. App. 1987); cf.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator& Standard Sanitary Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1148
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This view, although not widely held, was adopted for at least some
situations by the Oregon Supreme Court in a series of attorney disciplinary
cases. In the first case, In re Banks,79 the accused lawyers, Thompson and
his law partner Banks, represented a family corporation owned by R.S.
Michel, his wife, and his two daughters, each of whom was also a director of
the corporation. Michel was the company's "creator, organizer, founder,
chief executive, and driving force" and completely dominated the business,
running it "as his private fief."1 ° The lawyers conducted estate planning,
will drafting, and other private business for Michel and his wife and
represented the corporation in both its business and litigation matters.
Thompson drafted a ten-year employment contract with the corporation
whereby Michel received a percentage of the gross income of the corporation
and was thus "in a position to assure himself of substantially all immediate
benefits from the operation of the corporation."81 The wife and daughters
subsequently gained control of the corporation and Thompson took various
actions against Michel, including rendering an opinion to the board that Michel
had breached his employment contract."
In defending against disciplinary charges brought by the Oregon State
Bar, the lawyers claimed that in drafting the employment agreement Thompson
represented the corporation and not Michel. The court, however, refused to
apply the general rule of entity representation "to a closely held family
corporation which is substantially controlled and operated by one person and
where the corporation's attorneys have been that person's personal attorneys

(E.D. Pa. 1969) (mem.) (holding counsel to unincorporated association has attorney-client
relationship with each member of the association). Both Wortham and Hecht involved application
of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and were distinguished in a case involving attorney
disqualification. See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App.
1993). In Responsible Citizens the court interpreted the relevant California ethics provision as
an attempt to avoid "emnesh[ing] members in the intricacies of the entity and aggregate theories
of partnership." Id. at 764 (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600 cmt.
(West Supp. 1994)); see also Security Bank v. Klicker, 418 N.W.2d 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that although Wisconsin follows the aggregate theory of partnerships for most purposes,
it does not follow that the entity theory does not apply in terms of the attorney-client
relationship).
An intermediate position is to treat partnerships and other unincorporated associations and
groups as entities "[i]f the group is seen as having an identity apart from the individuals who
comprise it." 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.13:103, at 390.2; see also Security Bank,
418 N.W.2d at 31 (stating a partnership is a legal entity if the parties treat it as one). Under this
approach, it is imperative that lawyers clarify whether they represent the group as an entity, the
individual members, or both. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.13:103, at 391.
79. 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978) (en bane) (per curiam).
80. Id. at 285.

81. Id. at 285-86.
82. Id. at 287-88.
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as well." 83 The court stated that "[a]t the time of the drawing of the contract
Michel was the corporation[,]"' and "[iln such a situation . . . common
sense dictates that the corporate entity should be ignored."
The court
acknowledged the entity theory underlying the ethics code provisions, but
viewed this situation as a "logical exception" necessitated by the reasonable
expectations of Michel.86
One year later, in In re Brownstein," the Oregon Supreme Court
reaffirmed and extended its willingness to ignore the entity representation rule
in some cases. The accused lawyer, Brownstein, represented a close
corporation comprised of three approximately equal owners, including Woods,
whom Brownstein represented in other matters as well.88
The disciplinary action arose out of Brownstein's role in structuring a
transaction in which a third party (who was also a client of Brownstein) made
a loan to the corporation and received stock in the corporation and a corporate
note personally guaranteed by Woods and another owner. The business
subsequently faltered and Brownstein was dismissed as counsel for the
corporation. Brownstein then represented the third party in an effort to collect
from Woods on his personal guaranty of the corporate note. 9
In response to Brownstein's defense that he represented the corporation
and not Woods personally, the court cited Banks for the proposition that "in
a small, closely held corporation the rights of the individual stockholders who
control the corporation and of the corporation are virtually identical and
inseparable. "90 In addition, although Woods did not testify unequivocally that
he thought Brownstein was representing him, the court expressed concern that
Brownstein never even discussed with Woods whom he represented or the
possibility of conflicting interests. This concern led the court to state broadly
that the attorney representing a close corporation may not undertake representation adverse to the stockholders because "[i]n actuality, the attorney in such
a situation represents the corporate owners in their individual capacities as well
as the corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made."91
After Brownstein, however, the Oregon Supreme Court retreated from the
extreme view that absent a clear understanding to the contrary, lawyers
representing small, closely held corporations necessarily represent the interests

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 290.
Banks, 584 P.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 292.
602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979) (per curiam).
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. (citing Banks, 584 P.2d 284).
Id. at 657 (citing Banks, 584 P.2d 284).
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of the individual owners. In a subsequent disciplinary case, In re Kinsey,9
the court limited Banks to situations "where the controlling stockholder was
the corporation."9 Thus, the Kinsey court held that a corporate lawyer could
not side with the controlling shareholder-directors against the corporation,
because loyalty to the corporate entity was necessary to protect the interests
of a minority shareholder. 94 As for its broad holding in Brownstein, the
court explicitly modified its prior language:
The language in Brownstein, "In actuality, the attorney in such a
situation represents the corporate owners in their individual capacities as
well as the corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made. .. "
should not be misinterpreted. It refers to the special relationship in Banks
where the controlling stockholder was the corporation. The appropriate
rule for a corporation with minority stockholders with substantial interests
such as Klinicki's 33 percent is:
"As a corporation speaks and acts only through its officers and
directors, its counsel is their legal advisor in respect to its affairs,
but in performing that duty he is acting as the corporation's
attorney only and not as the attorney of any of its stockholders,
directors, or officers as individuals, or any group or faction
thereof." 95
As Kinsey clearly demonstrates, difficulties may arise when the entity
theory of representation is applied to small organizations. In most instances,
however, the entity itself cannot simply be ignored, even in intra-organizational matters; this fact is especially true whenever there are minority interests in
conflict with the controlling shareholders, because these interests need the
protection offered by the standard ethics rule.96 Nevertheless, even if the
standard ethics rule insists on recognizing the separate existence of the entity
in all circumstances, including intra-organizational relations, the basic purpose
of such rules is not to exclude the possibility that the entity lawyer might also
represent one or more individuals, but rather to clarify that a lawyer who
represents an entity "does not thereby (and without more) become the lawyer
for any of the entity's members, agents, [or] officers."'
92. 660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983) (per curiam).
93. Id. at 670 n.10 (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 671.
95. Id. at 670 n.10 (citations omitted).
96. Absent the entity theory of representation, the only protection afforded a minority
shareholder is recognition of the special duties owed by lawyers representing fiduciaries such as
majority shareholders. While some cases have recognized the special status of minority
shareholders and other beneficiaries as "derivative clients," the extent of protection provided
under this doctrine is unclear. See infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
97. 1 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.13:102, at 387; accordABA Comm. on Ethics
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Thus, under a proper reading of the attorney codes of conduct, there is
always a strong possibility the lawyer has not one, but multiple, clients. 98
Indeed, it is commonly recognized that individuals involved in an organization
sometimes suppose that the lawyer represents them as well as the organization.9 9 Even the highest officials in large publicly held corporations "often
consider themselves to be indistinguishable from the entity.""3 As a result,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[i]n dealing with an
organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent
that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing. "101
The problem is most acute in closely held corporations and small
partnerships where, as the Banks court recognized, distinguishing between
representation of the entity and its individual members is more difficult. This
difficulty exists because, unlike the publicly held corporation, the ownership
and management are substantially identical.'I As a result, even entities in
which a single dominant shareholder does not exist, counsel "typically will
have regular contact with [the owners] and may well have personal relationships with some or all of them, each of whom is likely to have a significant
financial stake in the enterprise.""3 In this context, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine who speaks on behalf of the entity. Rather, "counsel
is more likely to find individual participants attempting to realize their
personal goals through the enterprise."' 4 Because these individuals often
have the legal authority to direct the affairs of the business,135 neither
counsel nor the individuals are likely to distinguish between advising the entity
and advising the individual constituents.
Numerous authorities acknowledge the possibility of multiple representation in the entity context." 6 However, these authorities fail to articulate a
clear and consistent standard for determining when attorney-client relationships
will be found between the entity lawyer and the concerned individuals.
According to one view, in the absence of a clear understanding that the lawyer

and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, at 3 (1991).
98. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(e) (1992) ("A lawyer
representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.").
99. 1 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.13:102, at 390.
100. Id. § 1.13:109, at 399-400.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(d) (1992).
102. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 76, at 476-77.
103. Id. at 479.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 480.
106. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 49.
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is representing only the entity and not the individual interests, the lawyer
should be found to represent the individuals, at least in their dealings with one
another.'0 7 This view, however, is similar to that taken by the Oregon
Supreme Court before it decided Kinsey and is not widely followed.1 8
The more prevalent (and less radical) view is that there is a presumption
that entity lawyers represent only the entity itself and not the individuals unless
the specific circumstances show otherwise.' 0 9 Unfortunately, it is not at all
clear what circumstances suffice to demonstrate individual representation in a
particular case. According to the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility,
[w]hether such a relationship has been created almost always will
depend on an analysis of the specific facts involved. The analysis may
include such factors as whether the lawyer affirmatively assumed a duty
of representation to the individual . . ., whether the [individual] was
separately represented by other counsel when the [organization] was
created or in connection with its affairs, whether the lawyer had represented an individual . . . before undertaking to represent the [entity], and
whether there was evidence of reliance by the individual . . . on the
lawyer as his or her separate counsel, or evidence of the [individual's]
expectation of personal representation." 0
One or more of these factors is commonly present in entity representation,
especially in representation of those involving small, closely held corporations
or partnerships. Yet, it is extremely rare for courts to find an attorney-client
relationship between an entity lawyer and an individual constituent. Thus,
despite the increased willingness of some courts to extend lawyer liability to
the individual constituents on grounds other than the existence of an attorneyclient relationship, cases like Torres, Egan, Fassihi, and Kelly, in which the
courts refuse to extend the parameters of an attorney-client relationship,
remain the norm.
IV. FROM A CONTRACTS TO A TORT-BASED STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Part of the difficulty of articulating standards for the formation of the

107. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 506. For a discussion of a similar view applied in the
context of lawyer disqualification, rather than lawyer malpractice or discipline, see infra text
accompanying notes 123-50.
108. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 500.
109. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, at 3
(1991).
110. Id. at 4 (discussing representation of a partnership) (footnote omitted).
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attorney-client relationship in the entity representation cases is that courts
continue to emphasize the contractual nature of the relationship even when the

action is brought in tort."

While most courts do not require a formal

contract," 2 they do look for conduct evidencing "'an offer or request by the
client for legal services and an acceptance of the offer by the attorney.'""'
Moreover, some courts insist that the relationship is consensual and can only
exist with the consent of both parties." 4 Because an entity lawyer rarely
intends to enter into an attorney-client relationship with a constituent - unless
the legal services involve personal matters unrelated to entity affairs" 5 - it
is extremely unlikely that an entity lawyer will be found to have entered into

such a relationship under this test.
The strict contract-based approach has little to justify it, at least in the
many jurisdictions in which malpractice actions can be brought in tort. After
all, the courts began abandoning the privity of contract requirement in
negligence actions as early as 1916116 in favor of tests that emphasize the
foreseeability of harm as the most important factor in establishing the existence
and scope of the duty owed by one person to another." 7 In the legal

111. In most jurisdictions an attorney's implied contract to exercise ordinary skill and
knowledge gives rise to a remedy in tort, as well as in contract. 1 MALLEN &SMITH, supra note
1, § 8.5, at 417. In a controversial decision, the Illinois Supreme Court recently held that while
non-clients can sue an attorney in tort, clients suing for purely economic harm can sue only in
contract. Collins v. Reynard, 1991 11. LEXIS 104. See generally William C. Way, Note, The
Problem of Economic Damages: Reconceptualizing the Mooreman Doctrine, 1991 U. ILL. L.
Rnv. 1193.
112. Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir.
1993).
113. E.g., Mursau Corp. v. Florida Penn Oil & Gas, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 259, 262 (W.D. Pa.
1986) (quoting e.g., Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 463 F. Supp. 914, 919
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (mem.)), aft'd, 813 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.), and aff'd, 813 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1987).
114. See, e.g., Mursau Corp., 638 F. Supp. at 262; Torres v. Divis, 494 N.E.2d 1227 (II1.
App. Ct. 1986). This strict contract approach has been modified, though only slightly, in the
recent draft of the Restatement (Third)of the Law Governing Lawyers. In the draft, the client's
consent is still required, but the lawyer's consent may not be required, i.e., if the lawyer
fails
to manifest lack of consent to [provide legal services], when the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies
on the lawyer to provide the services, or [when] a tribunal with power to
do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services.
1d. § 26(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5 (1992)). For a discussion of the significance of this slight
modification of the more traditional approach, see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1389 (8th Cir. 1979) ("The only way in
which [the plaintiff] could have substantiated his claims against the attorneys is to have offered
proof that [the attorneys] contemporaneously performed services for him, personally." (citing
United States Indus., Inc. v. Goldman, 421 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (mem.)).
116. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
117. See, e.g., Hilliker, supra note 4, at 47-49 (discussing MacPherson in the context of
products liability actions); see also supra text accompanying note 20 (discussing the trend in
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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malpractice field itself, most jurisdictions that permit some departures from
strict privity in third-party liability cases do so not on the basis of contract
doctrine but rather on the basis of the "balance of factors" test in negli-

gence.118 Even in standard legal malpractice actions, courts have recognized

at least one instance in which the relationship is nonconsensual: situations
involving court-appointed lawyers." 9
Assuming tort theory is preferable to contract, 12° an appropriate tortbased approach to the formation of an attorney-client relationship must still be
determined. The "balance of factors" approach has the advantage of explicitly
acknowledging that the question is one of policy and not form;' 2 ' however,
it provides almost no guidance on how particular cases will be resolved. As
a result, the test is unsatisfactory in determining whether an attorney-client

California to eliminate restrictive tests in various aspects of negligence law in favor of using
"foreseeability as the key component necessary to establish liability"). For a discussion of the
trend to abolish the strict privity requirement in negligence cases against accountants, see Hilliker,
supra note 4, at 49-54; Lawson & Mattison, supra note 6, at 1309.
Of course there are limits to the usefulness of foreseeability as the key to establishing a duty
of care, even outside the legal malpractice area. For example, most courts have rejected attempts
to create a new tort for the negligent infliction of economic harm, instead preferring to govern
these relationships by what they perceive to be the more relevant contract doctrine. See, e.g.,
Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and PossibleEnd of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law,
26 GA. L. REv. 601, 658 (1992). Under the negligence doctrine, however, most courts permit
legal malpractice actions to be brought in tort, see supra text accompanying note 111, where
foreseeability of harm continues to be the most important factors in determining the existence of
a duty. See generally, Schwartz, supra, at 658 (discussing the dominance of negligence doctrine
in modern tort law, including limitations in particular areas). Even the one jurisdiction that has
recently held that clients can sue their attorneys only in contract, and not in tort, still permits nonclients to sue in tort. See supra text accompanying note 111.
118. See, e.g., 1 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 382-83.
119. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 216; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26(2)(c) & cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992) (discussing the creation
of an attorney-client relationship via court-appointed counsel).
120. Tort theory may be preferable to contract theory simply because most jurisdictions permit
a legal malpractice action to be brought in tort and because the strict privity requirement has been
abolished as a basis for determining the existences of a duty in most tort actions. In addition,
this move can be justified by reference to the underlying bases of tort and contract doctrine.
According to at least one commentator, contract doctrine covers obligations voluntarily assumed,
while tort doctrine covers obligations imposed by law. David B. Gaebler, Negligence,Economic
Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593, 593 (1986). As a general matter, it is certainly
desirable that both attorneys and clients decide whether or not to enter into an attorney-client
relationship. However, clients (whether actual or putative) are not typically informed about the
'prdrequisites for entering into a contractual relationships with attorneys. Thus, it seems
preferable to look to tort rather than contract doctrine to determine whether, as a matter of law
(i.e. public policy), lawyers should be found to have entered into relationships with those
individuals who reasonably believe they are clients of a lawyer, particularly when the lawyer can
foresee and, therefore, avoid such reliance.
121. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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relationship has been formed, just as it has proved unsatisfactory in determining the scope of an attorney's duty to third parties.'2

In negligence cases generally, courts typically emphasize foreseeability as
the critical factor in determining the existence of a duty in tort.'21 In the
typical personal injury case, foreseeability refers to the foreseeability of harm
to a particular plaintiff. While foreseeability of harm has been rejected as too
broad a test for determining the existence of a lawyer's duty to third parties,
124
because it casts too wide a net and dilutes lawyers' loyalty to their clients,
foreseeability might still play a significant role in determining the existence of
an attorney-client relationship in cases of entity representation." z For
example, because there is inherent, or at least frequent, ambiguity regarding
the question of client identification in entity representation cases, a foreseeable
risk exists that absent an affirmative effort by lawyers to clarify their role,
individual constituents will reasonably believe that lawyers represent them.
The reasonable expectations of a would-be client have not yet been recognized

as a basis for establishing an attorney-client relationship in legal malpractice
cases.1 26 However, there is considerable support in another line of entity
representation cases - those involving attorney disqualification from litigation
adverse to a former "client" - for the proposition that an attorney-client
relationship (or its functional equivalent) may be found whenever there is a

122. See supratext accompanying notes 15-21 (discussing application ofbalance of factors test
in California third-party liability cases).
123. See supratext accompanying note 117.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
125. For example, the recent draft of the Restatement makes a slight modification to the strict
contract standard for the formation of the attorney-client relationship in cases where the client,
but not the lawyer, has manifested consent to the relationship and the lawyer "fails to manifest
lack of consent to do so, [or] when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26(2)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992). Interestingly, the Restatement
justifies this modification as an exemplification of the principle of promissory estoppel, thus
perpetuating the contract-based model of the formation of the attorney-client relationship. Id. §
26 cmt. e. Elsewhere, however, the Restatement abandons the contract model in favor of a tort
model. See, e.g., id. § 26(2)(c) (recognizingthe attorney-clientrelationship when a court appoints
a lawyer to provide services).
126. A comment in the Restatement hints at but does not fully embrace this position. Under
the heading "Organizational, fiduciary, and class action clients," the comment states that
"[c]ircumstances may require that a lawyer clarify with those involved whether the client is the
organization, individuals related to it, or both." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992). The comment does not indicate what
consequences might follow when a lawyer fails to clarify the attorney-client relationship.
Moreover, the text of § 26 makes only slight modifications to the strict contract-based model for
formation of an attorney-client relationship, including maintaining a minimal requirement that the
client "manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the
person." Id. § 26(1).
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foreseeable risk that the individual constituents will act under the reasonable
belief that the entity lawyer represents them as well as the entity itself.
Just as courts have done in the area of third-party liability, ' courts in
recent disqualification cases have demonstrated an increased willingness to take
action adverse to an attorney - here to grant a motion to disqualify an
attorney from representing a client in pending litigation - despite the lack of
evidence establishing an attorney-client relationship under a strict contractbased approach." In the earliest cases, beginning with E.F. Hutton & Co.
v. Brown, 29 the courts seemed ready to broaden the test for establishing an
attorney-client relationship. However, in later cases, some courts have
dispensed with the need to find an attorney-client relationship at all, relying
instead on a broader notion of fiduciary duty, much as the Fassihicourt did
1 30
in a case involving third-party liability.
In E.F. Hutton a federal district court found that an attorney-client
relationship was established when an attorney representing E.F. Hutton & Co.
appeared on behalf of Brown (then an E.F. Hutton regional vice-president) in
SEC and bankruptcy hearings. Although the court acknowledged that the
lawyer was representing the corporation at the hearings, it held that he was
also representing Brown individually.13 Taking "judicial notice that it is not
uncommon for corporate counsel to represent an individual corporate officer
when he is sued as a result of actions he has taken within the ambit of his
official duties,"13 1 the court stated that "[a]n attorney's appearance in a
judicial or semi-judicial proceeding creates a presumption that an attorneyclient relationship exists between the attorney and the person with whom he
appears."13 While this narrow holding will seldom be applicable in other
127. See supra text accompanying note 3.
128. A much cited case exemplifying the application of the traditional approach to disqualification in entity representation cases is Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956). There
the court refused to disqualify a corporation's lawyer in a lawsuit filed by the receiver for the
company against Hopps - a former director, member of the executive committee, and chairman
of the board - for dominating and managing the company's affairs for personal gain. Id. at 11.
Despite the extent to which Hopps may have identified the corporate interest with his own
interest, the court refused to consider that the lawyer may have had an attorney-client relationship
with Hopps. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the familiar doctrine that an "attorney
for a corporation represents it, its stockholders and its officers in their representative capacity"
and "in nowise represents the officers personally." Id. at 14; see also Terre Du Lac Property
Owners' Ass'n v. Shrum, 661 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (noting the court's refusal
to disqualify plaintiff's lawyer who had represented the corporation owned by the individual
defendant in another lawsuit, citing entity theory of representation and refusing to distinguish
between generally held and closely held corporations).
129. 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
131. 305 F. Supp. at 387.
132. Id. at 388.
133. Id. at 387 (footnote omitted).
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cases involving entities and their constituents, the court went on to address
another factor on which it relied - "Brown's reasonable understanding of his
relation with the attorneys" - which the court deemed to be "the controlling
factor here." 3 ' Given that Brown was aware that evidence developed at the
hearings could be used against him as well as against the company, the court
found that "[i]n this atmosphere it would seem reasonable and natural for
Brown to have assumed that [the lawyer] represented him as well as Hutton
when the [lawyer] accompanied him to the hearing[s]."' 35 Thus, the court
granted Brown's motion to disqualify the law firm from representing Hutton
in an action against Brown for alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
to the corporation.' 36
Subsequent to E.F. Hutton, some courts continue to rely on the "reasonable expectations" of a moving party in attorney disqualification cases.
However, beginning with Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 137 courts have shifted from using such expectations as a basis for
determining whether an attorney-client relationship has been formed, focusing
instead on the existence of a separate fiduciary duty. In Westinghouse the law
firm of Kirkland and Ellis (Kirkland) had been retained by the American
Petroleum Institute (API) to assist it in resisting legislative proposals to break
up the oil companies. Kirkland was asked to conduct surveys and interviews
of API member companies (of which there were at least fifty-nine). API told
Kirkland to keep this information "'in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to
any other company, or even to API, except in aggregated or such other form
as will preclude identifying the source company with its data.'"' 8 Further,
the individual companies were told that Kirkland was acting as independent
special counsel for API and would hold any company information in strict
confidence, as set forth above.'39 Subsequently, three member companies
were among the defendants sued in an action brought by Westinghouse which was represented by Kirkland - seeking to establish an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade in the uranium industry. The three companies moved
to disqualify Kirkland from representing Westinghouse, claiming that Kirkland
had represented them when it obtained confidential information from them
related to the API matter. 14
The question was initially framed in terms of the existence of an attorneyclient relationship: "whether an attorney-client relationship arises only when

134. Id. at 389.
135. Id. at 390.
136. E.F. Hutton, 305 F. Supp. at 401.
137. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
138. Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1313 (quoting a letter API sent to Kirkland).
139. Id. at 1313-14.
140. Id. at 1312.
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both parties consent to its formation or can it also occur when the lay party
submits confidential information to the law party with reasonable belief that
the latter is acting as the former's attorney."141 Noting that the district court
had applied narrow, formal rules of agency, in which the relationship "'arises
only when the parties have given their consent, either express or implied, to
its formation,'""14 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to be
willing to adopt a more flexible test in recognition of the fact that an attorney
"'is dealing in an area in which he is expert and the client is not and as to
which the client must necessarily rely on the attorney.'"'"4 However,
apparently reluctant to decide whether each of the fifty-nine members of the
unincorporated association was an actual client of Kirkland, 1" the court
found instead that the case "c[ould] and should be decided on a much more
narrow ground." 14 Examining a number of situations in which a fiduciary
obligation had been recognized despite the lack of an attorney-client relationship - including the obligation to maintain confidences of a prospective client
and of criminal codefendants who exchange information regarding a common
defense - the court noted that what these situations have in common is "'the
client's belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested
intention to seek professional legal advice.'" 146 Thus, the court concluded
that because the three member companies in Westinghouse "each entertained
a reasonable belief that it was submitting confidential information regarding
its involvement in the uranium industry to a law firm which had solicited the
information upon a representation that the firm was acting in the undivided
interest of each company," 47 Kirkland had a fiduciary duty not to disclose
this information and should thereby 14 be disqualified from representing
Westinghouse in the pending litigation.
After Westinghouse, courts deciding disqualification motions typically
view the relevant issue as not whether the lawyer's relationship to the party
seeking disqualification "is in all respects that of attorney and client, but
whether there exist sufficient aspects of an attorney-client relationship 'for

141. Id. at 1312.
142. Id. at 1316 (emphasis in original) (quoting WestinghouseElec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.,
448 F. Supp. 1284, 1300 (N.D. Ill.) (mem.), rev'd in part, 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978)).
143. Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1317 (quoting Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967)).
144. The court did note that "[t]hree district courts have held that each individual member of
an unincorporatedassociation is a client of the association's lawyer." Id. at 1318 (footnote

omitted) (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
at 1319.
146. Id.(quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 88, at 179 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)).

147. Id. at 1321.
148. Westinghouse, 580 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
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purposes of triggering inquiry into the potential conflict involved'" in the
lawyer's representation in the pending litigation.' 49 Moreover, it is usually
sufficient for the moving party to demonstrate that it has submitted confidential
information to the lawyer with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting
as its attorney, regardless
whether the lawyer believed she was acting as that
0
party's attorney.15
Even under this expanded test, individual constituents in entity representation cases have sometimes found it difficult to establish a basis for attorney
disqualification. For example, in Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc.,", a
federal district court refused to disqualify the corporation's lawyer in a suit
brought against the corporation by Bobbitt, a fifty percent shareholderdirector. The court concluded that Bobbitt could not reasonably have thought
that the lawyer was acting as his lawyer, since Bobbitt had consulted the
lawyer primarily on corporate matters and thus could not have expected that
the discussions would not be revealed to others in the corporation. 5 2
If the primary test for attorney disqualification in the entity representation
context is a constituent's reasonable expectations of confidentiality, then the
"reasonable expectations" test is of limited use in the legal malpractice cases.
As Bobbitt demonstrates, constituents will rarely disclose information
regarding entity affairs which they will not assume will be shared with other
constituents. Other cases, however, do not limit disqualification to the
protection of confidences, but more broadly consider the importance of loyalty
in the attorney-client relationship. For example, in Rosman v. Shapiro5 3 the
court held that the corporation's attorney could not represent one fifty percent
shareholder in an action by the other."' The court found no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality, because the two shareholders jointly consulted
the attorney and thus neither could expect information to be withheld from the
other. 55 Nevertheless, the court agreed that Rosman, the moving party,
reasonably believed that the lawyer represented him as well as Shapiro:

149. Glueck v. JonathanLogan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746,748-49 (2d Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. 512 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). But see
Terre Du Lac Property Owners' Ass'n v. Shrum, 661 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (adhering
to traditional requirement of attorney-client relationship and entity theory of representation even
in disqualification case involving close corporation).
150. See Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Dart Group Corp., 621 F. Supp. 725, 730 (D. Del. 1985)
(mem.).
151. 545 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (mem.).
152. Id. at 1126; see also Wayland v. Shore Lobster & Shrimp Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1220,
1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that former shareholder, officer, director and employee "could
not have reasonably believed or expected that any information given to the [law] firm would be
kept confidential from the other shareholders or from the corporation as an entity").
153. 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
154. Id. at 1446.
155. Id.
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Although, in the ordinary corporate situation, corporate counsel does not
necessarily become counsel for the corporation's shareholders and
directors, where, as here, the corporation is a close corporation consisting
of only two shareholders with equal interests in the corporation, it is

indeed reasonable for each shareholder to believe
that the corporate
56
counsel is in effect his own individual attorney. 1
Moreover, the court further held that "[a] client reasonably expects that an
attorney will remain loyal to his interests in matters on which that attorney
previously represented him" and "[t]hat expectation is worthy of protection." 157 If a constituent's "reasonable expectations" that an entity lawyer
is representing the constituent individually are sufficient to protect the
constituent's interest in both confidentiality and loyalty, then it is perhaps a
fairly small leap to recognize of a full-scale attorney-client relationship, for
purposes of both disqualification and legal malpractice.'
V. REFINING AND APPLYING A "REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS" TEST
TO MALPRACTICE CASES INVOLVING ENTITY REPRESENTATION

Extending the logic of attorney disqualification cases, an appropriate tortbased test for determining the formation of an attorney-client relationship in
legal malpractice cases would focus on the reasonable expectations of the
would-be client. In a strict sense, the test in the entity representation cases
would be whether individual constituents reasonably believed that the entity
lawyer was representing them as well as the entity, regardless of the lawyer's
intent or belief, under circumstances in which such reliance was reasonably
foreseeable. In most cases, satisfying this test will require not only evidence
of the plaintiff's subjective belief, but also circumstances sufficient to make
that belief a reasonable one.
Quickly reviewing our initial sampling of entity representation cases,
Kelly v. Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman & Maycock5 9 is clearly the easiest case
to resolve. 6" Assuming Kelly testified that she believed the corporation's
lawyers were representing her individually, the surrounding circumstances
certainly would have supported this belief, particularly the explicit language
in the retention agreement that the law firm was going to provide advice
regarding the individual liability of corporate officers, directors and others in

156. Id. at 1445 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 1446.
158. For a discussion of the possible benefits of maintaining additional bases for attorney
disqualification, aside from recognitionof an expanded attorney-client relationship, see infra part
VI.
159. No. 89-4033 and 89-4039, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19742 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished
opinion).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
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connection with the securities offering.1 6' The circumstances would be even
stronger if the advice were given directly to Kelly and the other individuals.
Similarly, Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & 7ler,
P.C.'62 is a relatively simple case. Fassihi and Lopez were each fifty
percent shareholders of a small, closely held corporation. Aside from
corporations which exist as a virtual alter ego for a single, dominant
shareholder,' 63 corporations or partnerships with two or three relatively
equal shareholders are precisely the entities in which the members are least
likely to distinguish between the entity and the individuals," especially
when, as in Fassihi,the lawyer drafted the incorporation papers. After all, at
the time of the initial representation the entity had not yet come into
existence.'6 Unless the incorporators each had separate counsel, it is almost
inconceivable that they would not view the lawyer as representing them
individually.
Other cases pose somewhat greater difficulties. Unlike the lawyer in
Fassihi, the corporation's lawyer in Torres v. Divis'" had no direct dealings
with the plaintiff co-investor, even though the lawyer had agreed to incorporate and represent the corporation. 67 Moreover, while Torres testified that
he believed the lawyer was representing him, this belief was based in part on
representations made to him by Powers, the investor who was dealing directly
with the lawyer. 168 It might be unfair to bind lawyers solely on the basis
of unknown (and unforeseeable) statements of others, such as those Powers
made to Torres.' 69 However, in this instance the relationship of the lawyer
to the individual investors was inherently ambiguous, and in such inherently
ambiguous situations, lawyers who fail to clarify their roles - as they are
ethically required to do 7 0 - ought to be held to have entered into an
attorney-client relationship with persons who reasonably rely on the lawyer for
legal advice or protection of their interests.
A more difficult question would arise if Torres had testified that absent
161. See Kelly, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19742, at *7.
162. 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
163. See In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (per curiam), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 79-86.
164. Cf. Mitchell, supra note 76, at 503-04 (stating that each of the equal sides expects
counsel's assistance in obtaining advantage over other); see also supra text accompanying notes
102-05.
165. See Fassihi,309 N.W.2d at 647.
166. 494 N.E.2d 1227 (I11.App. Ct. 1986).
167. Id. at 1230-31.
168. Id. at 1231.
169. Cf.Guillebeauv. Jenkins, 355 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (seller told purchaserthat
she preferred defendant law firm to handle closing. Purchaser hired defendant law firm to handle
closing on behalf of purchaser, but purchaser did not disclose seller's request to the firm).
170. See supra text accompanying note 101; see infra text accompanying note 194.
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the statements made by Powers, he would not necessarily have understood the
lawyer to be representing him individually. After all, it is often confusing for
laypersons to know when an attorney-client relationship has been formed,
particularly when they have not been asked to pay any legal fees. Indeed, it
does not seem at all far-fetched that individual constituents like Torres would
candidly testify that they had not really thought about the question in precisely
those terms, but that they were certainly relying on the attorney to protect
their interests in the transaction.'
This position may have been taken by Rohrich, had he lived to testify in
Egan v. McNamara.17 McNamara, the lawyer-defendant, had provided
extensive estate and corporate planning services to Rohrich, both prior to and
subsequent to his joining the corporation as an officer, director, and general
counsel. While Rohrich retained other lawyers as well, including the lawyer
who actually prepared the buy-sell agreement that was the subject of the
malpractice suit, McNamara conceded that he reviewed the agreement to
which he was also a party." 3 Rohrich might well have testified that while
he had not specifically considered whether McNamara was representing him
in reviewing the agreement, he generally thought of McNamara as his lawyer
and relied on McNamara to protect his interests in the agreement. Nevertheless, the determining factor in Egan should have been McNamara's further
testimony that "he expressly told Rohrich not to rely on him as counsel since
he was party to the agreement." 7 4 Although not emphasized by the court,
this explicit delineation by McNamara of his role, in the face of what he
reasonably foresaw as possible confusion on Rohrich's part, should have been
sufficient to protect against a finding of an attorney-client relationship in that
case.
171. For example, in Goerlich v. Courtney Indus., Inc., 581 A.2d 825 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990), cert. denied, 586 A.2d 13 (Md. 1991), plaintiff Goerlich was an officer, director, and
one-third shareholder of the defendant corporation when the defendant lawyer was retained by
the corporation to draft a shareholders' agreement. The agreement contained a statement that
Goerlich would be a managing employee of the corporation for the duration of its existence.
Goerlich, 581 A.2d at 827. In refusing to find that the lawyer owed a duty to determine whether
such statement was false or contrary to the law, the court initially relied on the general rule that
the lawyer owed a duty only to the corporate employer. However, the court further stated
"[e]ven assuming that there was some contractual privity between [the lawyer] and Goerlich in
his capacity as an officer, director, and shareholder of the corporation, there was no contractual
privity between [the lawyer] and Goerlich in his capacity as an employee of the corporation." Id.
at 827. Contrary to this opinion, it is unlikely that Goerlich would have distinguished
representation of him in his capacity as an officer, director, and shareholder and representation
of him in his capacity as an employee. In any event, because the statement was made in the
context of a shareholder's agreement, it is clear that Goerlich relied on the lawyer to protect his
interest in his employment capacity, regardless of whether he believed that there was an actual
attorney-client relationship.
172. 467 A.2d 733 (D.C. 1983).
173. Id. at 737.

174. Id.
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VI. RECONCEPTUALIZATION VERSUS FuNCTIONALISM

We may want to assume that entity constituents like Torres, Fassihi, and
Kelly should recover damages from an entity lawyer because there was a
foreseeable risk that they would reasonably rely on the lawyer to protect their
interests, and they suffered harm as a result. However, perhaps the better

solution is to craft liability rules which do not rely on an expansion or
reconceptualization of the attorney-client relationship. After all, not all
problems can be solved by "specifying 6x ante the identity of 'the client.'" 115
Indeed, there is much to be said in favor of a more functional approach, in
which the purpose of examining the relationship is taken into account (e.g.,
malpractice, disqualification, evidentiary privilege) 7 6 and in which additional
categories are recognized (e.g., prospective client' and "quasi-client"').
One alternative which has been proposed is to recognize a special status
for corporate constituents as "quasi" or "derivative" clients of an entity
lawyer.17 9 This suggestion - which apparently would apply regardless of

175. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., TriangularLawyer Relationships:An ExploratoryAnalysis, I
GEO. I. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 41 (1987).
176. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizingthe Client-LawyerRelationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
825, 841 (1992) (suggesting a "functional or balancing approach, in which each situation, or
small class of situations, would be separately considered in light of the relevant interests and
policies").
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 27 (Tentative Draft No.
5, 1992) (treating lawyer's limited duties to "prospective clients" as a category separate from
duties owed to "clients"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ 73(1)

(Council Draft No. 10, 1993) (treating lawyer's liability to "prospective clients" as a category
separate from liability to both "clients" and "non-clients"). CompareTogstad v. Vesely, Otto,
Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding a defendant
attorney liable to a prospective client because an attorney-client relationship arose after attorney
negligently advised client) with Procanik v. Cillo, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.)
(holding the defendant attorney not liable notwithstanding the court's express recognition of the
special duties owed to a prospective client), cert. denied, 550 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1988).
178. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 45 (1978). Professor
Hazard now prefers to use the term "derivative client" for the same purpose. Hazard, supra note
175, at 31 (attributing origin of term "derivative client" to Dean Patterson in L. RAY
PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 65 (1982)); see also
1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.3:108, at 78 (attributing origin of term "derivative
client" to Justice Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1076,
1082 & n.1 (N.J. 1978) (per curiam) (Pashman, J., concurring in result)). For a discussion of
the difficulty of applying this terminology in the context of entity representation, see infra text
accompanying notes 182-84.
179. "Quasi" or "derivative" clients are persons who have a special relationship to a lawyer's
'primary" client, typically as beneficiaries of a client's fiduciary duty. See Hazard, supra note
175, at 38. Although it has been suggested that the terms can be applied in the context of the
relationship between a corporate client and its constituents, this application is highly problematic.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
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whether or not constituents reasonably believe they are being represented by
the lawyers - was initially developed to meet the special concerns of a lawyer
representing a fiduciary, such as a trustee or a guardian. 18 Because the
lawyer is engaged to represent the fiduciary, "and the fiduciary is legally
required to serve the beneficiary, the lawyer should be deemed employed to
further that service."181
There are several problems with using the "derivative" client approach
in the entity representation cases. First, it is the constituents who typically
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation,and not vice versa, and so the original
premise of the fiduciary-beneficiary relationship breaks down." s Second,
and equally important, the precise nature and scope of a lawyer's duty to a
derivative client remains unclear. Thus far, the recognized duties appear to
be limited to a duty of loyalty (e.g., a heightened obligation to avoid
participating in a fraud) and perhaps a duty of disclosure (e.g., when the
lawyer discovers wrongful conduct on the part of the primary client toward the
derivative client)."
As so limited, these duties might not be sufficient to
protect even constituents like Fassihi, who alleged a breach of fiduciary duty
but whose ouster may not have been the result of unlawful conduct. They are
certainly insufficient to protect constituents like Kelly, who reasonably relied
on the lawyer to exercise reasonable care to protect her interests."M

180. See Hazard, supra note 175, at 33.
181. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 35, § 1.3:108, at 78.
182. In his initial essay, Professor Hazard very clearly articulated the difference between
lawyers representing guardians, who owe fiduciary duties to their wards, and lawyers
representing corporations, to whom corporate officers owe fiduciary duties. See Hazard, supra
note 175, at 16. However, the consequences of this difference were never fully articulated.
183. See, e.g., 1 HAZARD & HoDES, supra note 35, § 1.3:108, at 79 (discussingthe attorney's
duty to disobey instructions of the primary client that would wrongfully harm the derivative
client/beneficiary). The drafters of the Restatementhave struggled to articulate the precise nature
of the duties of lawyers representing fiduciaries. Most recently, the reporters rejected a broad
duty to prevent or rectify a breach of fiduciary duty in favor of a more limited duty to prevent
or rectify a "crime or fraud violating a fiduciary duty owed by a client" and even then, only
"when the non-client is not reasonably able to protect its rights and recognizing such a duty
would not create inconsistent duties significantly impairing the. performance of the lawyer's
obligations to the client." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(4)(b)
(Council Draft No. 10, 1993).
184. Professor Hazard suggests at one point that derivative clients may have a cause of action
against the lawyer for the primary client for mere negligence, or for "being inattentive to his
responsibilitiesin representing the guardian." Hazard, supra note 175, at 18. The case on which
this suggestion is based, Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976), was
indeed a negligence case; however, it was limited to negligence in discovering that the guardian
was defrauding his incompetent ward. The case clearly does not hold that lawyers for fiduciaries
owe the beneficiaries a general duty of care. In addition, the Restatement has thus far rejected
any broad duty of a lawyer to prevent breaches of fiduciary duties by their primary clients,
limiting the duty to the prevention or rectification of crimes or frauds. See supra text
accompanying note 183.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:659

A functional approach broad enough to encompass both Fassihiand Kelly
would have to incorporate at least two doctrinal bases for recovery by a nonclient in an entity representation case. Constituents like Fassihi would be
covered by fiduciary duties arising either from the "derivative" status of
constituents" or from confidential trust relationships to be determined on
a case by case basis.' 86 Those like Kelly would be covered, if at all, by
some theory of third-party liability. However, even assuming that an
appropriate theory of third-party liability for entity constituents could be
developed,'8 there is an obvious danger that such a "radical functionalism" 8' would result (perhaps already has resulted) in an unnecessary
proliferation of confusing categories. 189
The relative simplicity of the proposed alternative - reconceptualizing the
attorney-client relationship - is one of its several advantages. Another
advantage is that unlike third-party liability, modifying the attorney-client
relationship to take account of the reasonable expectations of putative clients
is unlikely to result in any vast or indeterminate liability. The total number
of putative clients is relatively small and, perhaps more importantly, lawyers
can avoid liability simply by making sure (as they are ethically required to do
anyway)"9 that the individuals involved clearly understand the limits of the
lawyer's role.19'
185. Whether "all" entity constituents are to be considered derivative clients of the entity's
lawyers is unclear. The concept begins to break down when the relationship between the parties
becomes antagonistic and may not apply at all when the parties are engaged in arm's length
negotiations, at least when the parties are separately represented. See Hazard, supra note 175,
at 33-36. In addition, it is hard to imagine that all constituents would be covered, even in a
"normal" situation, since constituents can include low-level employees and small shareholders
of large publicly held corporations. At the very least, constituents who may reasonably believe
that the lawyer is protecting their interest should be covered.
186. See supra text accompanying note 65.
187. In Kelly v. Kruse, Landa, Zimmerman &Maycock, No. 89-4033 and 89-4039, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19742 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished opinion), the court was willing to extend
third-party liability because the agreement between the lawyer and the corporation expressly
called for the lawyer to advise corporate officers of their potential liability under the securities
laws and thus there was a clear intent to benefit Kelly as a third party to the lawyer-client
relationship. However, for the most part, courts have refused to extend the third-party
beneficiary doctrine (or even the balance of factor tests) in situations in which there is any
substantial possibility of conflicting interests between the client and the third party. See supra text
accompanying notes 21-25.
188. Leubsdorf, supra note 176, at 841 (advocating "neither the status quo nor a radical
functionalism, but merely a more conscious use of categories").
189. See id. (recognizing other dangers of a functional approach including "obvious potential
for vagueness and ad hoe improvisation").
190. See supra text accompanying note 101; see infra text accompanying note 194.
191. In at least some situations, it may be undesirable to permit lawyers to avoid liability
simply by clarifying that they are not representing the constituents and that the constituents should
not rely on them to protect their interests. For example, lawyers declining representationare held
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/4
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One reason courts have resisted extending the attorney-client relationship
is fear that it would result in the unethical representation of conflicting
interests."9 To some extent this concern is simply a function of a misunderstanding (or an overly mechanical application) of the ethics code provisions in
the entity representation area."9 On the other hand, there may be concern
that recognizing an attorney-client relationship when a lawyer has not
manifested consent to the relationship may subject a lawyer to discipline for
inadvertently representing multiple parties with conflicting interests, which
may well happen. However, lawyers can easily minimize that danger by
carefully attending to existing ethics rules which expressly caution them to
clarify the nature and scope of the representation whenever their role might be
misunderstood. In the context of entity representation, current rules require
that "[i]n dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity
of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."" 9 Aside from
entity representation, current rules also provide that
[i]n dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. 195
Thus, numerous authorities have urged lawyers dealing with groups (including
unincorporated associations) to clarify whether the lawyer represents the group
as an entity, as individuals, or both, particularly in the context of entity
employees and individuals who may not understand the lawyer's role and may
not have reason to appreciate the significance of any formal designation of that
role. 196
to a duty to act competently in giving advice to prospective clients even as the representation is
being turned down. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller &Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980) (en banc) (per curiam); Procanik v. Cillo, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied,550 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1988). Even if it is clear that the lawyer is refusing to represent the
client, nonetheless it is foreseeable that the prospective client is likely to rely on the lawyer's
advice. Thus, if liability is to be extended, it should be on the basis of the recognition of
separate duties owed to prospective clients, not on the ground of an actual attorney-client
relationship. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(1)
(Council Draft No. 10, 1993). For a further discussion of the possible need to recognize other
discrete categories, such as "quasi-clients" or "derivative clients," see infra text accompanying
note 244.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
193. See supra part I1.
194. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(d) (1992).
195. Id. Rule 4.3.
196. Cf. Roberts v. Heim, 123 F.R.D. 614, 624 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing a California CLE
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Another possible reason for the resistance to reconceptualizing the
attorney-client relationship is the fear that expanding the attorney-client
relationship beyond the limits of contract will inevitably lead to the unwarranted expansion of attorney duties to other parties."9 If so, then this concern
seems misplaced. After all, there is already a trend toward extending attorney
duties to third persons. If at least some of these cases can be explained by
acknowledging that the plaintiff was not really a third party but rather an
unintended client, then the trend could be slowed. This slow-down would
occur because lawyers will then better protect themselves by being more
explicit about whom they do or do not represent. In any event, the more
important question is not whether there will be an increase or decrease of
third-party liability, but rather whether courts will be able to articulate clearly
the more appropriate rationales for the extensions of duty that are already
being recognized.
The most serious issue arising from reconceptualizing the attorney-client
relationship are the implications reconceptualizing has on related issues in
which the attorney-client relationship plays a critical role. Examples of such
issues include attorney disqualification, determination of the existence of
attorney-client evidentiary privilege, and damages for breach of fiduciary
duties. An expanded attorney-client relationship is probably not problematic
when the issue is one of attorney disqualification, since courts have already
recognized a "fiduciary duty," even in the absence of a contractual relationship,19 and this situation - along with attorney-client evidentiary privilege
- might well be one in which an explicitly functional approach is clearly
justified.
A more difficult question could arise in lawsuits for damages for breach
of fiduciary duty; for example, a lawsuit against an entity attorney who
divulged to the entity information provided by a constituent who reasonably
believed that the attorney represented that constituent as well as the entity.
Perhaps the problem could be avoided by presuming that joint clients (i.e., the
constituent and entity) have agreed that any information provided by one will
not be held in confidence from the other, as is presently the case with the

publication cautioning lawyers for limited partnerships to "'properly identify the client and state
clearly to all parties, in writing, the implications of the representation'"); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992); 1
HAZARD & HODES,

supra note 35, § 1.13:109, at 399-400.

197. For example, although there is little support in the case law for recognizing a lawyer's
duty to non-clients to prevent crimes imminently threatening death or serious bodily injury, as
there is for psychotherapists, such a duty is being proposed by the Reporters to the Restatement.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(4)(a) & cmt. g (Council Draft No.

10, 1993). Undoubtedly, this proposal will be highly controversial.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 137-50.
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attorney-client evidentiary privilege. "I If not, lawyers may occasionally find
themselves caught in an impossible situation; for example, when a managing
partner who has been previously represented in other matters by the partnership lawyer confides in the lawyer that the managing partner has embezzled
partnership funds. Neither the lawyer's withdrawal nor the lawyer's disclosure
is an entirely satisfactory response in these situations. Nevertheless, the
possibility that lawyer might be held liable to either the managing partner (if
the lawyer discloses the confidential information)' or to the partnership (if
the lawyer fails to disclose)"' is neither inconceivable nor necessarily
undesirable. After all, the lawyer could easily have avoided the problem by
clarifying the nature and scope of the attorney-client relationship at the outset,
and thus it was the lawyer's own conduct that created the lawyer's dilemma
in the first place.
It is certainly possible that reconceptualizing the attorney-client relationship along the lines suggested in this article may create unintended difficulties
However, this risk
both inside and outside the field of legal malpractice.'
must be weighed against the potential benefits of such a reconceptualization.
The potential benefits in the entity representation area have already been
discussed. 1 3 Adopting this approach may reap similar benefits in some nonentity cases as well.
VII. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN
OTHER INHERENTLY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS

Aside from entity representation, a number of recurring situations are
fraught with potential ambiguity regarding the identity of the client. These
situations include representation of family members, representation in
transactions between buyers and sellers or borrowers and lenders, and
representation of fiduciaries, including trustees and guardians. In each of
these situations, the cases reflect the same confusion currently found in entity

199. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 146, at 219-20.
200. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (ethical duty of
confidentiality).
201. Cf. id. Rule 1.4(a) (expressing the attorney's duty to keep client reasonably informed).
If lawyers withdraw from representing the partnerships, they are arguably no longer under a duty
to inform. However, lawyers withdrawing from representation owe duties "to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests." Id. Rule 1.16(d). At this point a clear
tension exists between attorneys' duty to keep the individual partners' confidences and their duty
to protect the partnerships' interests.
202. For example, although it may be desirable to bind lawyers to an attorney-client
relationship under circumstances of inherent ambiguity, it would probably not be desirable to bind
prospective clients in these same circumstances. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 26 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
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representation cases, along with an increasing willingness on the part of courts
to impose liability on the attorney in at least some circumstances. Given these
similarities, it is probable that reconceptualizing the attorney-client relationship
will result in better, more coherent decisions in these areas, as well as in the
entity representation area.
A. Family Representation
When a lawyer represents a family member, particularly in matters
relating to the family, there is often confusion regarding who it is the lawyer
represents. Indeed, the dangers in this context may be even greater than in
entity representation. Unlike corporate lawyers, who frequently are clear in
their own mind that they are lawyers for the corporations and not the
constituents, "lawyers faced with requests for. . . family representation are
often unable unequivocally to identify 'the client.'"" Perhaps this inability
is because a family, unlike a business, is not ordinarily viewed as an entity
(even by lawyers), but rather as a collection of individuals whose goals are
sometimes shared and sometimes in conflict. 5
Not surprisingly, this potential for ambiguity results in outcomes in legal
malpractice cases which are strikingly similar to the entity representation
cases. Absent evidence of an agreement or a mutual understanding that the
lawyer will represent more than one person, courts typically reject any finding
of dual representation, despite obvious indications that one family member has
relied on a lawyer retained by another family member (typically a spouse) for
legal representation affecting the interests of both. 206 Furthermore, in doing
so courts typically invoke the standard conception of the attorney-client
relationship as essentially contractual in nature' and express concern that
the family members may have had conflicting interests. 3 In some cases,

204. Patricia M. Batt, Note, The Family Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical
Dilemmas ConfrontingElderLaw Attorneys, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 319, 325 (1992).
205. But see Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics ofRadicalIndividualism,65 TEX. L. REV.
963 (1987); Sidney D. Watson, Response: When ParentsDie:A Response to Before Guardianship: Abuse of PatientRights Behind Closed Doors, 41 EMORY L.J. 863 (1992).
206. See, e.g., Jordan v. Lipsig, Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis, P.C., 689 F. Supp. 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (mem.).
207. Id. at 195 ("Since an attorney-client relationship is essentially contractual, ordinary 'rules
governing contract formation determine whether such a relationship has been created.'" (quoting
Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F. Supp. 391, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (mem.))); see also McFarland v,
O'Gorman, 814 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("In order to state a cause of action on
a contract, one must be a party to that contract from which the action arises." (citations omitted));
Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 156 (rex. Ct. App. 1989) ("The legal relationship of
attorney and client is purely contractual and results from the mutual agreement and understanding
of the parties concerned." (citation omitted)).
208. See, e.g., Makela v. Roach, 492 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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the result is patently absurd. For example, in Makela v. Roach,209 an
Illinois appellate court refused to find that a lawyer engaged by the wife for
estate planning purposes also represented her husband, even though as a direct
result of the lawyer's advice to the wife, the husband voluntarily transferred
his interest in jointly held property to the wife.21 0 The court also noted that
the lawyer could not have owed the husband a duty of care, since part of the
plan was for the lawyer to represent the wife in a dissolution of marriage
action, "thus making [the husband] the opposing party in an adversarial
process, "211 even though the purpose of dissolving the marriage
was to
21 2
protect the family's assets from the husband's medical creditors.
The court in Makela also rejected liability under a third-party beneficiary
theory, in part because of the perceived conflict of interest between the
husband and wife in the dissolution action.21 3 However, as in the entity
representation cases, other courts have recently indicated an increased
willingness to afford redress to a family member, usually under some theory
of third-party liability. Moreover, as in the entity representation cases, the
primary rationale for extending liability is that there was a foreseeable risk that
the "non-clients" would reasonably rely on the attorney to protect their
interests. For example, in Jordan v. Lipsig, Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis,
P.C.214 a federal district court permitted the husband to sue the wife's lawyer
for failing to advise the husband of a loss of consortium claim stating, "A
spouse should reasonably be able to rely on the representation afforded to the
injured spouse to inform him or her of his or her potential derivative claims
2 16 a Texas
for loss of consortium. "211 Similarly, in Parker v. Carnahan
appellate court permitted the wife to sue the husband's criminal defense lawyer
for failing to advise her of the dangers of filing jointly as part of a strategy to
reduce the husband's sentence for income tax evasion. The court expressly
acknowledged the likelihood that the lawyer's conduct had reasonably led the

209. Makela, 492 N.E.2d 191.
210. The lawyer had drafted joint wills for the husband and wife. However, this fact was
deemed irrelevant because the husband was not complaining about the will and had not requested
or received legal advice as to the matters which were the subject of the instant lawsuit. Id. at 193-

94.
211. Id. at 194.

212. Id.
213. Id. The court also stated that the husband had not benefitted from the transfer of marital
assets, although the plan was to transfer the property to the daughterand her husband, who would
in turn support both the husband and the wife. Id. The wife was not permitted to recover,
because the court found that the plan to evade the husband's creditors was fraudulent, although
there was no specific finding that the wife knew that the plan recommended by the lawyer was
unlawful. Id. at 194-95.
214. 689 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (mem.).
215. Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
216. 772 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
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wife to believe she was represented by the lawyer, but the court used this
conduct as a basis for extending third-party liability rather than reformulating
the standard for determining whether an attorney-client relationship had been
formed.217
Given the obvious potential for ambiguity in family representation, it is
certainly foreseeable that family members will sometimes rely on an attorney
to protect their interests in situations in which even the lawyer is uncertain
who is the client.218 If lawyers fail to clarify their role under circumstances
in which the risk of such reliance is foreseeable, then it is appropriate that
such lawyers be held liable if a family member is harmed as a result of
reasonable reliance. Moreover, as with the entity representation cases, it
probably makes more sense to rest liability on the existence of an attorneyclient relationship and not third-party liability, both as a means of limiting
third-party liability and of ensuring that the duties owed include not only
competence, but also loyalty and confidentiality.2" 9
B. Buyer/Seller and Borrower/Lender
Another area involving potential ambiguities in client identification
involves transactions between buyers and sellers or borrowers and lenders in
which there is only one attorney. Unlike entity or family representation, the
parties may have no prior or continuing relationship with each other or the
lawyer. However, in many of these transactions it is customary for only one
lawyer to participate3 m Moreover, even though the lawyer may have been
formally selected by one party for the purpose of representing that party alone,
it is not unusual for the non-client party to pay the lawyer's fee as part of the
underlying transaction." t Given the lawyer's usual role in drafting the
relevant documents, explaining their terms, and overseeing their execu-

217. Id. at 157. But see Kotzurv. Kelly, 791 S.W.2d 254, 258 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Parkerin support of a finding that a fact issue was raised regarding the existence of an attorneyclient relationship in a real estate transaction between family members).
218. This is especially true when the lawyer gives legal advice to the "unrepresented" family
member. For example, In re Estate of Nuyen, 443 N.E.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982),
the attorney for the husband-decedent, who had been a "close personal friend of decedent and his
family" and had represented the family in various matters, visited the wife during the husband's
last illness and told her he would help her. Subsequently, the wife consulted him (at that point
he had become attorney for the executor-bank), andhe advised her to renounce the will. If the
lawyer had not advised the wife that he represented the executor-bank and not her (as the court
found that he did, id. at 1103), the ambiguity was such that a finding of an attorney-client
relationship would clearly have been supported under the proposed test.
219. See supra text accompanying note 72.
220. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 33, at 263 (discussing conflicts arising from real estate

transactions).
221. See, e.g., Guillebeau v. Jenkins, 355 S.E.2d 453, 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
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tion, 2 clearly a foreseeable risk exists that some unsophisticated parties will
believe that the lawyer is there to protect the interests of both parties.
Here, courts have also been reluctant to find an attorney-client relationship absent sufficient evidence of either an agreement or a mutual understanding,' but somewhat less reluctant to extend third-party liability when the
"non-client" reasonably relies on the lawyer.224 As early as 1897, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a lawyer who represented a borrower
could be held liable to the lender, even absent an attorney-client relationship.'
There, the court justified liability on the ground that the lawyer
"undertook certain duties" for the lender (examining title and mistakenly
advising the plaintiff that she had a first mortgage when in fact she held a third
lien) "knowing that the plaintiff was relying on him, in his professional
capacity, to see that her mortgage was the first lien. "226 This theory,
embraced by some but not all courts, is known as the "gratuitous undertaking"
theory of third-party liability.227 It is most prevalent in these types of
transactions, especially where the lawyer for one party offers to file or record

a document for another."'
There are several problems with the gratuitous undertaking theory. First,

222. E.g., id.; Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 659 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987)
(mem.).
223. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 206 (1879) (noting the Court's refusal
to admit evidence of local usage that attorney examining title of applicant for loan was also acting
for lender because express provisions of contract between attorney and borrower); Guillebeau,
355 S.E.2d 453 (seller's desire that attorney for buyer represent her at closing not communicated
to attorney). But cf. Lawall v. Groman, 37 A. 98 (Pa. 1897) (finding evidence from which jury
might have inferred mutual understanding that attorney was representing lender as well as
borrower).
224. The leading case of Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, exemplifies the traditional
approach in which third-party liability is rejected. The Court adhered to the general rule that
there must be some privity of contract between the parties before the lawyer can be sued for
negligence.
225. Lawall, 37 A. 98.
226. Id. at 99.
227. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup. Ct.
1977). The doctrine is variously described as an: "assumption of duty," Cifu, supra note 4, at
14; "voluntary agency," Simmerson v. Blanks, 254 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); or
"undertaking," FEiNMAN, supra note 4, § 9.3.4. Some, but not all courts rely on either an
agency theory, see, e.g., Simmerson, 254 S.E.2d at 718, or a tort theory, see, e.g., American
State Bank v. Enabnit, 471 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Iowa 1991). See generally 1 MALLEN & SMrrH,
supra note 1, § 7.3, at 363-64.
228. The leading authority for the voluntary undertaking approach is Stewart v. Sbarro, 362
A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 371 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1976), in
which the attorney for the buyers of all the stock in a corporation failed to obtain signatures on
a mortgage to secure payment to the sellers, as they were required to do under the agreement of
sale. See also Sinnerson, 254 S.E.2d 716 (buyer's attorney gratuitously promised to file
financing statement for seller and was negligent in doing so).
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it may cover only acts of misfeasance and not nonfeasance. Thus, in Nelson
v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp. 9 a federal district court permitted the
borrower to recover from the lender's attorney because the lawyer affirmatively gave her certain legal advice regarding the transaction. The nub of her
complaint, however, was not the affirmative advice she had been given, but
rather the lawyer's failure to explain adequately her rights and the nature of
the documents she was signing." Given her allegation that the lawyer held
himself out as "'the' settlement attorney and purported to act on behalf of all
parties,"" it is at least arguable that her right to recover should not have
rested on the court's willingness to acknowledge an affirmative undertaking to
give her advice. Rather, the fact that he volunteered to provide a legal
explanation of the documents and affirmatively responded to questions she
raised should have been relevant primarily in determining whether the
circumstances were such that it was foreseeable that she would reasonably
believe that he was acting as her attorney.
Another problem with the gratuitous undertaking theory is that it is
uncertain how the doctrine can be limited to avoid both indefinite liability and
the imposition of duties to conflicting interests. As for limiting liability, one
jurisdiction has held that the lawyer must deal with the third party "face to
face. "I This factor is certainly relevant; however, if a lawyer can foresee
reasonable reliance even when the dealings between the parties are indirect,3 then the justification for imposing liability may be just as compelling
as in "face to face" transactions. As for conflicting interests, another
jurisdiction has held that a lawyer will not be found to have undertaken a duty
to a third party when there is a conflict with the lawyer's duty to the
client. 4 Once again, however, the existence of conflicting interests may be
relevant in determining whether the third party's reliance is reasonable;
however, if that party is unaware of either the fact or the significance of the
conflict, then the rationale for denying liability is unclear.
Part of the difficulty with the gratuitous undertaking doctrine is that these
transactions typically involve arm's length bargaining - where at least some
interests are likely to conflict - and yet it is not uncommon for one lawyer
to undertake to perform some aspect of the transaction for both parties,"s

229. 659 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987) (mem.).
230. Id. at 617.
231. Id. at 618.
232. Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1982) (noting that
the lawyer did not deal directly with the plaintiffs or act gratuitously on their behalf).
233. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 166-70.
234. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Anderson, 526 So. 2d 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (noting
that no duty arose out of debtor's lawyer's agreement with bankruptcy court to take certain steps
to protect creditors).
235. See Bergman v. New England Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1989) ("It is not
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even when both parties are separately represented. 5 Furthermore, even
when both parties are separately represented, it would not be unusual for one
party (and that party's lawyer) to rely on the other party's lawyer to perform
the task undertaken, 7 if only to avoid unnecessary duplication and inefficiency. If the rule is (as one court has broadly articulated it) that "where an
attorney assumes a fiduciary obligation, it applies to persons who, though not
strictly clients, he has or should have reason to believe rely on him," or where
"an attorney undertakes a duty to one other than his client, he may be liable
for damage caused by a breach of that duty to a person intended to be
benefitted by his performance,"" 8 then it is indeed a rule of potentially
indefinite application.
Perhaps there is some justification for recognizing a separate theory of
third-party liability for at least some gratuitous undertakings. Nevertheless,
it might prove easier to articulate the limited circumstances in which this
doctrine should apply if a significant number of these cases could be explained
on other grounds. In addition, if the third party's reliance is based primarily
on a misunderstanding of the lawyer's role, then basing liability on a
reconceptualized attorney-client relationship makes it easier for lawyers who
properly clarify their role to avoid any inadvertent undertaking of unwanted
duties.
C. Trustee/Beneficiary
Lawyers for a trust are generally considered to be representing the
trustee, an individual with fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries of the
trust. 9 As in the other areas of representation, the traditional rule is that
absent fraud or another malicious act, an injured beneficiary may not sue the
lawyer directly because there is no privity of contract. 40 Of course, the
earliest cases departing from the strict rule of privity were estate planning
cases. 241 However, the cases involving trusts and other fiduciaries have been
distinguished from the early will drafting cases on the ground that there are

unusual for the attorney representing one party to prepare the instruments which are to be signed
by all parties. It would stun the practicing bar to learn that when an attorney did so, he or she
became accountable as the attorney for all parties-signatory.").
236. See Stewart v. Sbarro, 362 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 371 A.2d 63 (N.J. 1976).
237. Stewart, 362 A.2d at 588 (noting sellers of corporate stock, who were separately
represented, successfully sued buyers' attorney who failed to obtain signatures on mortgage as
required under the contract).
238. Id. (citations omitted).
239. See generally Phelps, supra note 7, at 211.

240. Id. at 212.
241. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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conflicts of interest between trustees and trust beneficiaries which are not
typically present between testators and beneficiaries under a will. 2
Nevertheless, as in other areas, there has been significant movement away
from the strict rule of privity in a number of recent cases involving fiduciaries."
Some of these cases involve issues of public policy unrelated to any
confusion regarding client identification on the part of the beneficiaries. For
example, in Fickett v. Superior Cour4" an Arizona appellate court held that
a lawyer for a guardian owed duties to both the guardian and the ward.
Because the ward was incompetent, there was no possibility that he had relied
on the attorney to protect his interests. However, this incompetence (and
resulting inability to protect his interests) was in itself a compelling reason to
impose additional duties on the attorney as a matter of public policy.
It may be true that cases like Fickett can only be explained by recognizing
some type of functional approach to legal representation in which a lawyer's
duties are divided between "primary" and "derivative" clients. 5 However,
there are other cases in which the lawyer for a trustee or other fiduciary has
engaged in direct dealings with a beneficiary, causing considerable confusion
regarding the lawyer's role. For example, in Baer v. Broder2" a widow
who was both the executrix and the beneficiary of her late husband's estate
hired a lawyer to prosecute a wrongful death action on behalf of the estate.
When she later sued the lawyer in her individual capacity for malpractice, a
New York appellate court permitted a rare departure from that state's strict
privity rule, on the ground that "plaintiff and defendant were engaged in a
face-to-face relationship" and "[i]n a real sense, the plaintiff in this action was
also one of the real parties in interest in the wrongful death action. "247 The
case is typically viewed as an example of "special circumstances" in which
attorneys incur liability to third-party non-clients. 24 8 However, given that
the widow certainly did not distinguish between the lawyer's representation of
her in her institutional and her individual capacities, the case could just as
easily and perhaps more suitably be described in terms of an attorney-client
relationship. Similarly, in Pizel v. Zuspann4 9 an attorney for a settlor met

242. Phelps, supra note 7, at 212-13. But see Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616
(Ohio 1989) (stating that beneficiaries whose interest in estate had vested are in privity with
fiduciary and can sue lawyer for negligent performance).
243. See, e.g., Phelps, supra note 7, at 213-16.
244. 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
245. See Hazard, supra note 175, at 17-19.
246. 447 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1982) (mem.)
247. Id. at 539.
248. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
249. 795 P.2d 42 (Kan. 1990) (involving family representation because the co-trustees were
nephews of the settlor), modified on other grounds, 803 P.2d 205 (Kan. 1990).
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several times with the settlor's co-trustees, who were also intended income
beneficiaries upon the death of the settlor, for the purpose of explaining
various trust documents. The court refused to find an attorney-client
relationship between the co-trustee/beneficiaries and the lawyer. 50 Nevertheless, the court permitted the plaintiffs to sue the lawyer for negligent failure
to advise them of their trust duties because they were found to be third-party
beneficiaries of the contract between the lawyer and the settlor."' Once
again, given the obvious ambiguity concerning the lawyer's role, the case
could also be explained as yet another example of a lawyer inadvertently
assuming an attorney-client relationship by providing informal advice
concerning the trust.
The difficulty with the "derivative" client doctrine is that the nature and
scope of the lawyer's duties to such clients are unclear,1 2 particularly when
the relationship between a primary and a derivative client becomes antagonistic. 3 It may well be that like "gratuitous undertakings," there are some
fiduciary cases, such as Fickett, in which a separate doctrine of third-party
liability is necessary. This is particularly true where the lawyer's duty will be
limited to something less than the full panoply of duties owed an actual client.
Nevertheless, if the primary reason for extending liability is the lawyer's
failure to clarify her role, as in Baer and Pizel, then basing liability on an
extended and reconceptualized attorney-client relationship is almost certainly
a better approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law regarding the liability of attorneys to third-party "non-clients"
seems hopelessly confused. Most jurisdictions recognize at least some
departures from the traditional strict privity requirement; however, there is no
agreement regarding either the appropriate doctrinal basis or even the common
fact patterns in which courts will find an attorney liable. While it once
appeared that a lawyers's duty might extend to all who foreseeably would be
harmed as a result of the lawyer's negligence, courts have continued to

250. Pizel, 795 P.2d at 49.
251. Id.at 51.

252. See supratext accompanying notes 183-84.
253. This conflict happens most often between income and remainder beneficiaries where the
executor or trustee is forced to side with one against the other. See, e.g., Neal v. Baker, 551
N.E.2d 704 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (attorney for executor took position that plaintiff-incomebeneficiary,
rather than residuary estate, should pay inheritance tax), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 378 (Ill.
1990). In these cases, unless there is some confusion as to whose interest the lawyer is
protecting, there is no apparent reason why the lawyer should owe even a "derivative" duty to
one or the other group, as opposed to a full duty of care to the executor to assist it in fulfilling
its administrative and fiduciary duties.
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struggle to limit liability, partially driven by their concern to avoid embroiling
the lawyer in impermissible conflicts of interest, contrary to both public policy
and attorney ethical codes.
Attempts to rationalize third-party liability law through the adoption of a
single doctrinal approach seem doomed to failure. Rather, it is probably more
useful to acknowledge that what we have are various clusters of cases in which
liability is imposed for differing reasons. Therefore, the results of will
beneficiary cases differ fundamentally from legal opinion and gratuitous
undertaking cases, which, in turn, differ fundamentally from cases involving
fiduciaries taking advantage of incompetent or helpless beneficiaries. 4
Along these lines, this article has focused on a particular cluster of cases
in which there are inherent ambiguities regarding the appropriate identificationof the client or clients. This situation exists in many instances of entity
representation as well as in representation of family members, transactions
between buyers and sellers or borrowers and lenders, and representation of
trustees and other fiduciaries. This article proposes that these cases be treated
not as examples of when an attorney's liability might be extended to third
parties, but rather as examples of when actual attorney-client relationships may
be formed, even when the attorney had no intention of doing so. To
accomplish this result, it has been necessary to propose that the attorney-client
relationship be reconceptualized to take into account the reasonable expectations of persons, including entity constituents, who are understandably
confused as to who the lawyer actually represents. One of the advantages of
this approach is that it gives lawyers stronger incentive to clarify the nature
and scope of their representation. This clarification should not only reduce
attorney liability, but also avoid the very reliance which should not have
occurred in the first place.
Lawyers are increasingly confronting the legal consequences of their own
behavior. What they are discovering is that in addition to the ethical codes,
a host of legal doctrines regulate their conduct, either directly or indirectly,
including: 1) the law of malpractice (torts and contracts); 2) criminal law; 3)
criminal and civil procedure; 4) evidence; 5) agency; 6) securities; and 7)
corporation law. 5 Much of this doctrine is confusing, particularly as it is
254. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers creates four separate categories of
enforceable duties to non-clients: (1) duties to a prospective client; (2) duties to a non-client
when the lawyer or lawyer's client "invites" reliance; (3) duties to non-clients whom the client
intended to benefit; and (4) duties to non-clientswhen necessary to prevent certain types of harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1994).
The second category includes both the legal opinion and the gratuitous undertaking cases. The
third category refers primarily to the will beneficiary cases. Finally, the fourth category includes
both intended victims of a client's criminal conduct threatening imminent death or serious bodily
harm as well as victims of a breach of fiduciary duty who are not reasonably able to protect
themselves.
255. See Nancy J. Moore, Intra-ProfessionalWarfare Between Prosecutors and Defense
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applied to the relationship between attorneys and their clients and between
attorneys and third parties."
If we believe, as most of us do, that there
should be fundamental differences in the legal consequences which apply to
these two types of relationships, 7 then it is of critical importance that we
be able to distinguish between the two. Moreover, it is just as important that
the basis of the distinction be grounded not in the historical anachronism of
strict privity of contract, but rather in sound public policy taking into account
the reasonable expectations of those who would be clients.

Attorneys: A Pleafor an End to the CurrentHostilities, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 515 (describing the
"law of lawyering"). All of these various sources of law are presently being brought together
in the American Law Institute's ongoing Restatement project. See Charles W. Wolfmam, The
Conceptof a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 195 (1987).
256. Contributing to the confusion is the uncertain relationship between ethics law, as set forth
in ethical codes, and other law, including the-law of legal malpractice. See Moore, supra note
254, at 516 & n.9.
257. Even if we acknowledge that there are variations in the duties owed to different types of
third parties, including the "derivative client," there will still be differences between even a
"derivative client" and an actual client. See Hazard, supra note 175, at 39 (noting upon collapse
of triangular relationship, lawyer may continue to represent client "in the full and formal sense").
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